Saturday, June 25, 2016

On the Federal Lawsuit to Unbind Virginia Delegates

A new front has opened in the late-stage, intra-party battle over the Republican Party nominating Donald Trump in Cleveland. Those against the New York tycoon's nomination now have a multi-pronged approach that stretches beyond pushing for changes through the Convention Committee on Rules to now include legal action. A lawsuit has been filed in federal court by a Virginia delegate, Beau Correll, seeking relief from prosecution under Virginia code should he not vote for Trump at the convention.

There are advantages to allowing a convention of delegates to set the rules that will guide them as the Rules of the Republican Party allow. It grants the group the ability to tailor rules to suit a given convention at a given time and place. However, there are drawbacks to this approach as well. This lawsuit is one of them. The complaint the plaintiff brings in this case is expansive, but it boils down to a problem with the uncertainty of the rules that will govern the 2016 convention. If it was certain at this time -- that is, if the Republican Party had a locked-in set of rules -- that Rule 16(a)(2) was going to be in effect in Cleveland, then this case would be moot. There would literally be no potential for injury. In this instance injury is prosecution in Virginia for not following the candidate binding at the national convention as laid out in state law.

Even if the delegate voted contrary to how they were bound and even if the delegation chair from their state called out that "improper" vote in the tally, the secretary of the convention is charged under the current Rule 16(a)(2) with not recognizing that vote and announcing and recording it as bound. One could counter that that delegate vote was cast and contrary to the binding. In the sequence, that offending act according to Virginia state law precedes the secretary of the convention not recognizing it. The problem there is that there is no one at the convention from the Virginia State Board of Elections to say, "Beau Correll didn't vote according to how he was bound."

Furthermore, procedurally, the delegation chair does not call out individual votes. He or she announces the tally from the state. The bind breaker would not be known, then, unless there was a public poll (not a secret ballot) of the delegation by the chair of the delegation (and either the chair or another delegate comes forward with the revelation that someone has broken their bind). However, there is no procedure for this sort of voting in Republican Party of Virginia rules. Under those state party rules, there is no need for such a vote or poll of the delegation. Those results are already locked in based on the results of the March 1 presidential primary in the state.

All that is laid out in the Declaration and Statement of Qualifications that all delegate candidates in Virginia had to submit to run for delegate vacancies in the first place. Here is the important third and final paragraph from that form:
I further acknowledge, understand, and agree that if elected and if given the ability to vote at the Republican National Convention, my vote on the first ballot will be bound by the results of the March 1, 2016 Virginia Presidential Primary, in accordance with the Allocation Resolution adopted by the RPV State Central Committee on September 19, 2015. I further acknowledge that all costs associated with my candidacy and potential service as a National Delegate Alternate are my own responsibility. [Emphasis is FHQ's]
Now, the language here does leave open the notion that Virginia delegates will vote at the convention. Yet, that vote on the presidential nomination is bound based on the results of the primary under state party resolution and not state law. That is an important distinction because this lawsuit is being brought against the penalties in state law and not state party rules. State party actions bind the Virginia delegates.

What is missing is clear guidance from the party as to how the delegation chair is to behave at the convention. If the chair takes the vote in the primary as guide, then there is no need for a poll of the delegates. By extension that means that there is no potential for rogue action on the part of a delegate, no discovery of it and thus no violation of the state law. But if a vote is held -- and it would have to be public and/or someone from the Virginia State Board of Elections (or some representative from the state) would have to be there at the time of the vote -- then the potential exists for a violation of state law.

The Republican Party of Virginia has most of its bases covered on this one; that it is the governing authority over the process in Virginia and not state law. But it is not air-tight. The if associated with the actions of the delegation chair cited above is part of that. However, there is also the matter of state law versus state party rule/bylaw/resolution. The Rules of the Republican Party -- Rule 16(b) -- gives precedence to state party actions over state law. Yet, since the rules are not set in stone, and will not be until the convention in Cleveland, that cover is not officially there. Unlike Rule 16(a)(2), though, Rule 16(b) is not controversial and is likely to be carried over by the 2016 convention.

Though the complaint is long, this lawsuit essentially amounts to those two questions. The rest of it is just a series of distractions. State law simply is not the guiding force over delegate selection and allocation in Virginia, though there is the potential for prosecution on the grounds of violating the binding established in that law. Decided narrowly, a federal court could deem the state penalty unconstitutional. But the Republican Party of Virginia has measures in place to bind the delegates without that. That is an in-house, intra-party battle the courts have generally been unwilling to weigh in on, leaving it up to the party to settle. And the matter will be settled at the convention in Cleveland, starting with the Convention Committee on Rules.


Recent Posts:
The Electoral College Map (6/23/16)

The Latest Installment of Stop Trump and the Rules

The Electoral College Map (6/21/16)

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Thursday, June 23, 2016

The Electoral College Map (6/23/16)



Polling Quick Hits:
Arizona:
The Grand Canyon state is one of those states that Democrats have mentioned the last few cycles as a state that could turn blue because of the growing Hispanic population there. However, it usually comes off the wish list as fall approaches and the focus shifts toward a narrower set of battleground states. A Trump nomination on the Republican side may change that sequence. May. Without additional polling, it is difficult to tell at this point. There have only been a handful of surveys in Arizona, and the most recent one from OH Predictive Insights has Trump at his high water mark in general election polling in the state. The firm has him at 42 percent and trailing Clinton. Not the best combination. But just so this note is somewhere in this update: It is early and more polling is needed. That goes for the following states as well.

North Carolina:
There have been 12 polls out of the Tar Heel state in 2016 and exactly half of them have been from North Carolina-based Public Policy Polling (including the latest). The Democratic-leaning firm has consistently shown a tight race between Clinton and Trump for the state's 15 electoral votes. There is something to be said about that consistency, but the rest of the polling in the state has been a mixed bag of results that seem to indicate wild fluctuations (Civitas) or a house effect that tilts in Clinton's direction (Elon). Without the PPP surveys, the Elon polls push the FHQ graduated weighted average in North Carolina more toward Clinton than is the case with them included. Clinton's advantage grows from around a point with the PPP polls to a little more than two points without. The key in the Tar Heel state is getting more polling -- like everywhere else -- but also a greater diversity of poll(-ing firms).

Texas:
The Leland Beatty poll of Texas is not really worth dwelling on. Yes, it is the first publicly available survey data out of the Lone Star state in 2016, but the poll comes from a firm that had no polls released in either 2008 or 2012. A Republican +7 margin is not unheard of in Texas, but nearly a third of the survey respondents were unsure. Those seem to have come disproportionately from Trump's support.






The Electoral College Spectrum1
HI-42
(7)
MN-10
(156)
NH-4
(245)
GA-16
(164)
SD-3
(53)
VT-3
(10)
WA-12
(168)
VA-13
(258)
MS-6
(148)
ND-3
(50)
MD-10
(20)
WI-10
(178)
PA-203
(278/280)
UT-6
(142)
NE-5
(47)
RI-4
(24)
NJ-14
(192)
FL-29
(307/260)
AK-3
(136)
AL-9
(42)
MA-11
(35)
NV-6
(198)
OR-7
(314/231)
TX-38
(133)
KY-8
(33)
IL-20
(55)
MI-16
(214)
IA-6
(320/224)
IN-11
(95)
AR-6
(25)
NY-29
(84)
NM-4
(219)
AZ-11
(331/218)
SC-9
(84)
WV-5
(19)
DE-3
(87)
CT-7
(226)
OH-18
(349/207)
TN-11
(75)
ID-4
(14)
CA-55
(142)
CO-9
(235)
NC-15
(364/189)
MT-3
(64)
OK-7
(10)
ME-4
(146)
KS-6
(241)
MO-10
(174)
LA-8
(61)
WY-3
(3)
1 Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum.

2 The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he or she won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, Trump won all the states up to and including Pennsylvania (all Clinton's toss up states plus Pennsylvania), he would have 280 electoral votes. Trump's numbers are only totaled through the states he would need in order to get to 270. In those cases, Clinton's number is on the left and Trumps's is on the right in bold italics.


To keep the figure to 50 cells, Washington, DC and its three electoral votes are included in the beginning total on the Democratic side of the spectrum. The District has historically been the most Democratic state in the Electoral College.

3 Pennsylvania
 is the state where Clinton crosses the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election. That line is referred to as the victory line.



NOTE: Distinctions are made between states based on how much they favor one candidate or another. States with a margin greater than 10 percent between Clinton and Trump are "Strong" states. Those with a margin of 5 to 10 percent "Lean" toward one of the two (presumptive) nominees. Finally, states with a spread in the graduated weighted averages of both the candidates' shares of polling support less than 5 percent are "Toss Up" states. The darker a state is shaded in any of the figures here, the more strongly it is aligned with one of the candidates. Not all states along or near the boundaries between categories are close to pushing over into a neighboring group. Those most likely to switch -- those within a percentage point of the various lines of demarcation -- are included on the Watch List below.

The Watch List adds North Carolina to the the previous (6/21/16) update.


The Watch List1
State
Switch
Alaska
from Lean Trump
to Toss Up Trump
Missouri
from Toss Up Trump
to Toss Up Clinton
New Hampshire
from Lean Clinton
to Toss Up Clinton
New Jersey
to Strong Clinton
to Lean Clinton
North Carolina
from Toss Up Clinton
to Toss Up Trump
Pennsylvania
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Tennessee
from Lean Trump
to Strong Trump
Utah
from Toss Up Trump
to Lean Trump
Virginia
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Wisconsin
to Strong Clinton
to Lean Clinton
1 Graduated weighted average margin within a fraction of a point of changing categories.


Wednesday, June 22, 2016

The Latest Installment of Stop Trump and the Rules

Throughout primary season Reince Priebus, the Republican National Committee chairman, repeated a familiar refrain. Whether asked about the possible nomination of Trump or the New York businessman's potential impact on the party platform, Priebus kept saying essentially the same thing: it is up to the delegates. The intent now as then is the same. It is a balance between a party apparatus wanting to assure those affiliated with it that has some control over a process but that does not want it to appear as if it has its thumb on the scale. That is a balancing act that is tough under normal conditions, but takes on a heightened level of difficulty when a party is divided and/or has a unique frontrunner/presumptive nominee.

In 2016 the Republican Party has both. It has an unconventional presumptive nominee who has not only faced resistance all along, but who has reactivated traditional dividing lines within the party and animated dormant or latent ones.1 And both facets feed each other. Seemingly every word or deed from Donald Trump fuels the fire of opposition that has been longer in duration than that of any other cycle since the nearly evenly matched fight for the 1976 Republican nomination between Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan.

The difference from 1976 to now is that Trump warded off all of his challengers on his way to a clear majority of bound delegates. Yet, pockets of resistance remain, small though they may be when compared to the full population of national convention delegates, and continue to search for outlets for their collective opposition to the presumptive Republican presidential nominee. The latest, spurred by an organizing minority faction of delegates, revisits the oft-discussed proposal to unbind the delegates through a change of the Rules of the Republican Party at the convention in Cleveland. An alternative change -- a conscience clause -- would allow delegates an out if they disagree with the presumptive nominee to whom they are bound.

Either proposal makes enough sense in theory (for that minority faction), but getting to that point -- a rules change -- is another endeavor altogether. There are a couple of layers to this. First, the path leads through the Convention Rules Committee. Some have argued that it would take just 57 votes to change the rules; to unbind the delegates or at the very least provide some of them with an opportunity to opt out of supporting Trump in a roll call vote on the floor of the convention.

But that is an oversimplification that obscures two important points:
1) It largely ignores the membership of the committee. The majority of the publicly known members of the Convention Rules Committee are members of the RNC themselves. That suggests at least something about the motivations of the committee. While they may not necessarily be Trump supporters, members of the RNC -- national committeemen and committeewomen and state party chairs -- are more likely than the elected at-large and congressional district delegates to defend the bulk of the rules that govern the Republican nomination process. To be clear, these automatic delegates on the Convention Rules Committee are not stooges of the Republican National Committee. The three of them from each state are elected at the state level and carry with them to national party functions the diversity of views represented across the country. That said, those delegates are more likely to fall in line with the balancing act described above; to carefully consider not only rules changes, but their implications as well.

All this is to say that those members of the Convention Rules Committee may not support Trump (or be bound to him on the roll call vote), but they have a common interest in A) (theoretically) defending the current rules2 and B) avoiding the sort of chaos that detracts from the goal of the modern national convention. In other words, letting a rules fight get out of the Committee and onto the floor hurts the ability of the party to demonstrate some semblance of unity before a national audience.3

2) It is also worth noting that the bar is not actually as high as 57 votes -- a simple majority of the 112 member Convention Rules Committee -- to change the rules. That is the surest way of making a change, but there are other, perhaps more plausible goals for those seeking to halt a Trump nomination or at the very least make his getting to a formal nomination more difficult. If the Stop Trump delegates fail to get an unbinding rules change through Rules, the current rules do allow them the ability to send a minority report (amendment) to the floor for consideration by the convention. That maneuver, under the provisions of Rule 34, only requires the support of one quarter of the membership of the Convention Rules Committee (or 23 votes). This is a pretty limited power, however. Such an amendment (from a minority faction) can be tabled and very likely would be if the chair of the convention does not back the move.

Limited though that power could be, getting a minority report to the floor would be a step up from the   small scale backlash from Ron Paul supporters in Tampa in 2012. Again, the formal party within the convention would be motivated to avoid the 2012 ante being upped in 2016. As such, this is a bit of leverage for those who want Stop Trump. This was likely at least part of the calculus behind Priebus's call to state party leaders to assess the extent of anti-Trump sentiment among the 56 delegations. Getting a sense of that whip count both in the Rules Committee and on the floor is an important piece of information

The flashpoint for all of this -- this back and forth -- is the Convention Rules Committee meeting before the convention commences. A very likely middle ground is that the Rules Committee report to the full convention is likely to keep the bulk of the rules in place for consideration after the convention in 2017-18. That means that any move to unbind the delegates or provide for a conscience clause is likely to be dead on arrival or barring that doomed to fall short.

Yet, the one tweak that might make it out of committee that also might provide some level of protest against Trump is some variation of the Blackwell amendment tabled at the RNC winter meeting in Charleston earlier this year. The mechanics of this can be technical, but essentially what the amendment would do is clean up the language in Rule 16 (the rule binding delegates to candidates) and bring it in line with Rule 40 (the rule that lays out the process for placing candidates in nomination). As it stands now, only those votes (whether bound or from the small number of unbound delegates) for candidates placed in nomination are counted. Votes for, say, Rubio or Kasich -- candidates who control a majority of delegates in fewer than eight states -- would not be counted. Even if they were released, those delegates votes would only be recorded if they opted to vote for Trump (or Cruz if he hangs on to his delegates and has his name placed in nomination).4

Relaxing the provisions of Rule 16 to allow votes for other (now) non-qualifiers to be recorded and counted by the secretary of the convention is not a cure-all. In fact, as this latest, delegate-driven attempt to derail Trump's nomination is still in its infancy, the idea may seem quite unpalatable to those folks. However, while it is also a limited bargaining chip, it one that might give those in the Stop Trump faction one last outlet of opposition to Trump's nomination.

Of course, there is still about a month until the convention and this latest Stop Trump iteration may not have crescendoed yet. Given where the other attempts have ended up, history, it seems, does not appear to be on their side. And the balancing act is all up to the delegates.


--
1 This likely requires further explication. No, Trump has not necessarily directly charged the historical fault lines within the party. However, none of the factions in it have been able to coalesce around an effective plan to slow down or prevent a Trump nomination. The lack of agreement there has had the indirect effect of exacerbating the extant divisions.

2 This is certainly true if there is any stalemate on the committee regarding the package of rules change recommendations Rules makes or individual changes the committee may discuss. In both cases, if the committee grinds to a halt, the likelihood of the status quo rules (or something very close to them) carrying over increases.

3 That may, admittedly, be difficult regardless in 2016.

4 That does not seem likely at this point.


Recent Posts:
The Electoral College Map (6/21/16)

The Electoral College Map (6/17/16)

The Electoral College Map (6/16/16)

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Tuesday, June 21, 2016

The Electoral College Map (6/21/16)



Polling Quick Hits:
Florida:
Despite the headline-grabbing margin in the Quinnipiac battleground survey of Florida, the Sunshine state still remains very much in the heart of the Toss Up Clinton category in the FHQ graduated weighted average. Sure, Florida inched closer to the Lean category, but the more notable fact is perhaps that Florida is on the Democratic of Ohio on the Electoral College Spectrum below. The opposite was true in both 2008 and 2012 (though both states ended up in the Democratic column both times).

Ohio:
Quinnipiac's efforts in Ohio are a bit different than in Florida. The Q-poll is the only one to consistently show Trump ahead in the Buckeye state. Other than a Baldwin Wallace internet poll from February, Quinnipiac is the only one to show something other than a modest Clinton advantage. Without the handful of Q-polls, then, Clinton's lead approaches five points and the Lean category at FHQ.

Pennsylvania:
Contrary to the pattern in Ohio, the Quinnipiac polls in Pennsylvania have been consistent with the majority of polling in the Keystone state. With the exception of a couple of outliers (from other firms) indicating a double digit Clinton lead there, most of the survey work in Pennsylvania has shown a close race; Quinnipiac included. Pennsylvania is one of the few states that has thus far run contrary to the average uniform swing, toward rather than from Trump. A small consolation given the next state.

Utah:
The story in the Beehive state is not that race is close between Clinton and Trump. While Clinton is running marginally ahead of Obama's 2012 share of the vote in Utah in the latest survey from Dan Jones/Utah Policy, it really is all about where Trump is relative to Romney's 2012 support there. Currently, the New York businessman lags about 50 percent behind Romney 2012. Some to a lot of that will perhaps come back to Trump by November, but having to make up ground in Utah means effort and resources not used elsewhere.




The Electoral College Spectrum1
HI-42
(7)
MN-10
(156)
NH-4
(245)
GA-16
(164)
SD-3
(53)
VT-3
(10)
WA-12
(168)
VA-13
(258)
MS-6
(148)
ND-3
(50)
MD-10
(20)
WI-10
(178)
PA-203
(278/280)
UT-6
(142)
NE-5
(47)
RI-4
(24)
NJ-14
(192)
FL-29
(307/260)
AK-3
(136)
AL-9
(42)
MA-11
(35)
NV-6
(198)
OR-7
(314/231)
IN-11
(133)
KY-8
(33)
IL-20
(55)
MI-16
(214)
IA-6
(320/224)
SC-9
(122)
AR-6
(25)
NY-29
(84)
NM-4
(219)
OH-18
(338/218)
TN-11
(113)
WV-5
(19)
DE-3
(87)
CT-7
(226)
AZ-11
(349/200)
MT-3
(102)
ID-4
(14)
CA-55
(142)
CO-9
(235)
NC-15
(364/189)
TX-38
(99)
OK-7
(10)
ME-4
(146)
KS-6
(241)
MO-10
(174)
LA-8
(61)
WY-3
(3)
1 Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum.

2 The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he or she won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, Trump won all the states up to and including Pennsylvania (all Clinton's toss up states plus Pennsylvania), he would have 280 electoral votes. Trump's numbers are only totaled through the states he would need in order to get to 270. In those cases, Clinton's number is on the left and Trumps's is on the right in bold italics.


To keep the figure to 50 cells, Washington, DC and its three electoral votes are included in the beginning total on the Democratic side of the spectrum. The District has historically been the most Democratic state in the Electoral College.

3 Pennsylvania
 is the state where Clinton crosses the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election. That line is referred to as the victory line.



NOTE: Distinctions are made between states based on how much they favor one candidate or another. States with a margin greater than 10 percent between Clinton and Trump are "Strong" states. Those with a margin of 5 to 10 percent "Lean" toward one of the two (presumptive) nominees. Finally, states with a spread in the graduated weighted averages of both the candidates' shares of polling support less than 5 percent are "Toss Up" states. The darker a state is shaded in any of the figures here, the more strongly it is aligned with one of the candidates. Not all states along or near the boundaries between categories are close to pushing over into a neighboring group. Those most likely to switch -- those within a percentage point of the various lines of demarcation -- are included on the Watch List below.

The Watch List adds Utah to the the previous (6/17/16) update.



The Watch List1
State
Switch
Alaska
from Lean Trump
to Toss Up Trump
Missouri
from Toss Up Trump
to Toss Up Clinton
New Hampshire
from Lean Clinton
to Toss Up Clinton
New Jersey
to Strong Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Pennsylvania
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Tennessee
from Lean Trump
to Strong Trump
Utah
from Toss Up Trump
to Lean Trump
Virginia
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Wisconsin
to Strong Clinton
to Lean Clinton
1 Graduated weighted average margin within a fraction of a point of changing categories.


Friday, June 17, 2016

The Electoral College Map (6/17/16)





Polling Quick Hits:
Washington:
The good news is that there is now polling data from Washington. However, that poll -- from Public Policy Polling -- was not all that revealing. In fact, it is the most Washington poll of Washington polls. Both the candidates' positions and margin are entirely in line with the majority of the polling in the Evergreen state over the last two cycles. Take for instance, PPP's June 2012 survey of Washington: Obama 54, Romney 41. The first glimpse of Washington 2016, then, shows a race squarely in the same low double digits (Democratic) area it has been.


NOTE: A description of the methodology behind the graduated weighted average of 2016 state-level polling that FHQ uses for these projections can be found here.


The Electoral College Spectrum1
HI-42
(7)
MN-10
(156)
NH-4
(245)
GA-16
(164)
SD-3
(53)
VT-3
(10)
WA-12
(168)
PA-20
(265)
MS-6
(148)
ND-3
(50)
MD-10
(20)
WI-10
(178)
VA-133
(278/273)
UT-6
(142)
NE-5
(47)
RI-4
(24)
NJ-14
(192)
OR-7
(285/260)
AK-3
(136)
AL-9
(42)
MA-11
(35)
NV-6
(198)
FL-29
(314/253)
IN-11
(133)
KY-8
(33)
IL-20
(55)
MI-16
(214)
IA-6
(320/224)
SC-9
(122)
AR-6
(25)
NY-29
(84)
NM-4
(219)
OH-18
(338/218)
TN-11
(113)
WV-5
(19)
DE-3
(87)
CT-7
(226)
AZ-11
(349/200)
MT-3
(102)
ID-4
(14)
CA-55
(142)
CO-9
(235)
NC-15
(364/189)
TX-38
(99)
OK-7
(10)
ME-4
(146)
KS-6
(241)
MO-10
(174)
LA-8
(61)
WY-3
(3)
1 Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum.

2 The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he or she won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, Trump won all the states up to and including Virginia (all Clinton's toss up states plus Virginia), he would have 273 electoral votes. Trump's numbers are only totaled through the states he would need in order to get to 270. In those cases, Clinton's number is on the left and Trumps's is on the right in bold italics.


To keep the figure to 50 cells, Washington, DC and its three electoral votes are included in the beginning total on the Democratic side of the spectrum. The District has historically been the most Democratic state in the Electoral College.

3 Virginia
 is the state where Clinton crosses the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election. That line is referred to as the victory line.



NOTE: Distinctions are made between states based on how much they favor one candidate or another. States with a margin greater than 10 percent between Clinton and Trump are "Strong" states. Those with a margin of 5 to 10 percent "Lean" toward one of the two (presumptive) nominees. Finally, states with a spread in the graduated weighted averages of both the candidates' shares of polling support less than 5 percent are "Toss Up" states. The darker a state is shaded in any of the figures here, the more strongly it is aligned with one of the candidates. Not all states along or near the boundaries between categories are close to pushing over into a neighboring group. Those most likely to switch -- those within a percentage point of the various lines of demarcation -- are included on the Watch List below.

The Watch List remains unchanged from the previous (6/16/16) update.


The Watch List1
State
Switch
Alaska
from Lean Trump
to Toss Up Trump
Missouri
from Toss Up Trump
to Toss Up Clinton
New Hampshire
from Lean Clinton
to Toss Up Clinton
New Jersey
to Strong Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Pennsylvania
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Tennessee
from Lean Trump
to Strong Trump
Virginia
from Toss Up Clinton
to Lean Clinton
Wisconsin
to Strong Clinton
to Lean Clinton
1 Graduated weighted average margin within a fraction of a point of changing categories.