This is part one in a series of posts about 2017 legislation seeking to alter state laws concerning the timing of presidential primary elections or caucuses.
A careful reading of the set up post to this piece is revealing of an omission to the group of states that made caucus-to-primary shifts in 2016. While Maine and Minnesota took more conventional routes -- passing legislation establishing presidential primary elections to replace caucuses -- Colorado voters took an atypical path in the state's switch to a presidential primary for the 2020 cycle.
And it is not that Colorado legislators had not tried to make the change. Efforts in both 2015 and 2016 languished in the committees to which they were referred and died when their respective sessions adjourned. In addition, the 2016 bill was introduced with the 2016 caucuses process in the Centennial state as the backdrop. That "debacle" featured a state Democratic party overwhelmed by a large turnout (and other subsequent problems) and Republican process that elected delegates but without an attendant preference vote for president. The result was that Coloradans of all political stripes were left unsatisfied with the process.
Enough were disenchanted and organized -- even in the time in mid-spring around which the 2016 presidential primary legislation was introduced -- that an initiative was approved and added to the November general election ballot. When the legislative effort failed, then, there was a citizen-driven effort, approved by the Colorado secretary of state, to fill the void. That initiative, Proposition 107, easily passed.
The practical effect was that 107's passage brought Colorado in line with Maine and Minnesota. Whereas all three states have had presidential primaries in the past, all three have been caucus states over at least the last four cycles. And like those other two caucus-turned-primary states, Colorado made the switch, but did not specify a date on which it would regularly occur. Instead, the new law as approved by the voters ceded the date-setting authority to the governor of Colorado, but with significant limitations.
The guidance provided allows the governor to set the date of the primary on a Tuesday 1) not before the earliest date allowed by the national parties and 2) no later than the third Tuesday in March. That gives the state some leeway, but not much. Before September 1 of the year prior to the presidential election, the Colorado governor will have the ability to set the date of the primary on the first, second or third Tuesday in March.1 Together, all three weeks saw a significant chunk of delegates allocated in 2016. That window was a clustered area on the 2016 primary calendar, but one in which the Colorado caucuses were scheduled anyway.
All of that is simple enough. First, there is a switch in Colorado from a caucus to a primary. And additionally, that contest will be conducted during the first three weeks of March 2020. However, there are at least a couple of relevant caveats for which to account.
1) This is not the only instance of a state that arrived at a presidential primary by a voter-driven initiative. Washington is another example, and the experience in the Evergreen state over the last 25 years is instructive if not cautionary. Washington has held its presidential primaries in that time but the state parties there have often held the contest at arms length. The Republican Party has only partially and occasionally used the contest as a means of allocating its national convention delegates. This past cycle, 2016, was the first time in the Washington primary era that the party used the primary results to guide the allocation of all of its delegates.
The Democratic Party has been worse. In that time, the party has only ever utilized the primary as a beauty contest, most often occurring after the first determining step of the delegate allocation process (the precinct caucuses). Delegates, then, have been allocated based on the state party-run caucuses rather than the primary.
One could potentially see the partisan roles reversed in Colorado. Democrats spearheaded the early legislative efforts in the Centennial state to trade in the caucuses for a primary. But a small number of Republicans in the state legislature were able to kill those bills in committee. Moreover, Colorado Republicans not only opted for closed caucuses in 2016, but chose to eliminate the preference vote at the precinct level in an attempt to continue the state party tradition of sending an unbound delegation to the Republican National Convention. A higher turnout primary among Republicans much less the independents now allowed to participate may be more than the party wants.
Could the Colorado Republican Party opt out of the primary in the way that Washington Democrats have?
The answer appears to be no. On the one hand, Colorado Republicans could take the state to court on freedom of association grounds since under the guidelines of the new primary law, independents are allowed to participate. Neither chair from either of Colorado's two major parties was a fan of that part of the change in the lead up to the election last November.
Possible court challenges aside, there is a further complication for Colorado Republicans; one not faced by Washington Democrats. Historically, Colorado has been one of the few states where state legal code affected things like the timing of caucuses. In most caucus states, that is a matter solely left up to the state parties. But in Colorado, state law described the parameters under which caucuses were conducted. That is part of the reason both parties there held caucuses on the same night in 2016. Both parties have also historically followed the letter of the law that part of the statute.
But it, too, was altered by the ballot initiative voters passed in November 2016. Rather than giving the parties the option of the first Tuesday in February or March to hold caucuses, the new law lays out a Saturday after the primary date for party precinct caucuses (to begin the process of selecting delegates). That is an important change. If the parties had maintained the option of holding earlier caucuses, Colorado Republicans could have opted into that type of contest in lieu of the later primary.
That is, of course, assuming the party chose to replicate its 2016 strategy: caucuses without preference votes. And again, that practice was at least part of the rationale driving the ballot initiative in reestablishing the presidential primary in 2016.
But that February option is off the table. It is no longer in the statute. And without it, Colorado Republicans would be forced, under Republican National Committee delegate selection rules, to allocate delegates based on the initial statewide contest, in this case the primary.
2) One additional, far less detailed caveat, is that the Colorado General Assembly during its 2017 session tweaked the law adopted via the November ballot initiative. And the emphasis is on the word "tweak". This was not an effort to repeal or reverse the changes coming from Proposition 107 as has happened elsewhere. Instead, the move in Colorado was to clean up and clarify a number of points. For our purposes, the changes were twofold.
First, the legislature empowered the secretary of state along with the governor to settle on the date of the presidential primary. Technically, the pair could be from different parties which could present either benefits or challenges. The more practical rationale behind the move is to bring into the process the main election administrator in the state.
SB 17-305 also clarified the protocol by which the state is to handle the participation of voters unaffiliated with either of the two major parties (who are now allowed to participate in the presidential primary).
Governor Hickenlooper (D) signed SB 17-305 into law on May 19, 2017 and it will likely take effect in August.
--
1 This assumes that the national parties maintain their preference for non-carve-out states to begin holding primaries and caucuses on the first Tuesday in March and after. If that changes, then the Colorado window could expand or contract.
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Colorado. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query Colorado. Sort by date Show all posts
Monday, May 22, 2017
Wednesday, May 1, 2019
Governor Polis Sets Colorado Presidential Primary Date for Super Tuesday
The decision aligns the Colorado presidential primary with primaries or caucuses in 13 other states and territories. Already the most delegate-rich date on the 2020 presidential primary calendar, the addition of primary in the Centennial state puts even more weight on the March 3 Super Tuesday.
This will be the first cycle in which Colorado has conducted a presidential primary since a three cycle run from 1992-2000. Parties in the state have held caucuses since then.
--
1 Full press release from Governor Polis's office announcing the date:
Governor Polis and Secretary of State Griswold announced March 3rd, 2020 as Colorado’s new presidential primary date
TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 2019
DENVER — Today Governor Jared Polis and Secretary of State Jena Griswold announced March 3rd, 2020 as the new date for Colorado’s presidential primary. The two were joined by leaders from the Democratic, Republican, Unity American Constitution and Approval Voting parties.
“Our Super Tuesday primaries will be a tremendous opportunity to participate in democracy and for Coloradans to have their voices heard by presidential candidates in all parties,” said Governor Jared Polis. “We are proud of 2018’s record turnout, as well as Colorado’s status as a leader on voting rights. We hope to build on that momentum by participating in a primary along with other Super Tuesday states to ensure that all major candidates listen firsthand to the concerns of Colorado voters.”
In 2016, Colorado voters overwhelmingly approved Proposition 107, which restored primary elections in Colorado in presidential election years. The state was previously using the caucus system.
“I am excited to join Governor Polis in officially setting March 3, 2020 -- Super Tuesday -- as the date for Colorado’s 2020 presidential primary. This will be the first presidential primary in Colorado in 20 years -- and the first where unaffiliated voters will be able to participate,” said Secretary of State Jena Griswold. “As Colorado’s Secretary of State, I believe in the power of our democracy. A secure and accessible presidential primary will give Coloradans the opportunity to create the future we imagine.”
--
The Colorado primary date is now reflected on the 2020 FHQ Presidential Primary Calendar.
--
Wednesday, December 9, 2015
2016 Republican Delegate Allocation: COLORADO
This is part seven of a series of posts that will examine the Republican delegate allocation rules by state. The main goal of this exercise is to assess the rules for 2016 -- especially relative to 2012 -- in order to gauge the potential impact the changes to the rules along the winner-take-all/proportionality spectrum may have on the race for the Republican nomination. For this cycle the RNC recalibrated its rules, cutting the proportionality window in half (March 1-14), but tightening its definition of proportionality as well. While those alterations will trigger subtle changes in reaction at the state level, other rules changes -- particularly the new binding requirement placed on state parties -- will be more noticeable.
COLORADO
Election type: caucus/convention
Date: March 1
Number of delegates: 37 [13 at-large, 21 congressional district, 3 automatic (unbound)]
Allocation method: determined by state and/or congressional district convention(s) or left unbound
Threshold to qualify for delegates: n/a
2012: non-binding caucuses
--
It does. But we typically talk about sequence in meta-terms: how each state and their respective primaries and caucuses collectively line up on the presidential primary calendar.
Sequence, however, also matters in the delegate allocation or selection process within states. That is definitely true with regard to the unconventional method of delegate allocation/selection the Colorado Republican Party has opted to use during the 2016 presidential nomination cycle.
As has previously been discussed in this space, Colorado Republicans have decided to skip the presidential preference vote at its March 1 precinct caucuses. Now, that decision could be chalked up to a desire to skirt the new-for-2016 national party delegate binding requirements, a misunderstanding of the national party rules, or division within the state party organization. In reality, it is a little bit of all three. Practically though, the "how Colorado came to this point" question is less important than the "what effect the decision will have" one.
First, it is likely to turn the March 1 precinct caucuses into a non-event.1 With no preference vote, there is no real or easy way to gauge the winner of the caucuses. Since there is no presidential preference poll conducted at the precinct caucuses their is nothing on which to base any subsequent delegate allocation. And even the back up option -- counting the number of delegates that advance to the county assemblies aligned with particular candidates -- is compromised to some degree. Typically in caucuses, those who attend, meet and select folks from among their ranks at one step to move on to the next step in the process. That process continues to the congressional district level and/or the state convention level where national convention delegates are chosen from among those who are left from the whittled down group of original precinct caucusgoers.
That may yet be the case in Colorado, but it will be a bit atypical and messy getting there.
Candidates for delegate must file an intent to run form with the Colorado Republican Party chair no later than 13 days prior to the convention at which they would be elected (Rule XIII.A.5.a). For statewide, at-large delegates, that would mean 13 days before the April 9 state convention, and for congressional district delegates, 13 days before the congressional district conventions that meet between March 29 and April 9 (a filing deadline range from March 16-25).
To be eligible to run, a delegate candidate must:
- have been eligible to participate in the precinct caucuses
- have been a registered Republican in the state/district at the time of the precinct caucuses and remain so through the relevant convention (depending on which delegate position is sought, at-large or congressional district)
- have been a delegate, alternate or qualified voting member at the county assemblies
- be a delegate to the district or state convention (depending on which delegate position is sought, at-large or congressional district)
That pledge is much more important than is being discussed.
Colorado has been talked about as a state that will send an unbound delegation to the national convention. That would only be the case if all the delegate candidates who file intent to run forms opted to remain unaffiliated with any presidential campaign. If those delegate candidates pledge to a presidential candidate and are ultimately elected to one of the 34 delegate slots (not counting the party/automatic delegates), then they are functionally locked in with that candidate if that candidate is still in the race for the Republican nomination.
They would be bound to those candidates at the national convention because the Colorado Republican Party bylaws instruct the party chair to cast the delegation's votes at the national convention "in accordance with the pledge of support made by each National Delegate on their notice of intent to run". Anywhere from 0 to 34 delegates could end up bound from the Colorado delegation to the Republican National Convention.
That is a real wildcard in the delegate count in Colorado and nationally.
--
But let's return to sequence for a moment.
The precinct caucuses are on March 1. Intent to run forms are due no later than mid-to-late March, following at the very least the other primaries and caucuses held on or before March 15. The first puts a premium on organizing -- turning out as many supporters as possible for the precinct caucuses and then getting those supporters through to the county assemblies. It is only that group of county assembly participants who are eligible to be national convention delegates. Showing strength there is everything in the delegate allocation process in Colorado in 2016.
But we will not have an answer to that right away necessarily; not unless those that make it through to the county assemblies immediately submit intent to run delegate candidate forms (and the Colorado Republican Party actually reports those results). Regardless of the reporting from the state party, if a campaign is able to corner the market and move through to the next step a bunch of its supporters, that candidate will have a decided advantage in the delegate allocation process. They would dominate the pool of potential candidates and maximize the number of delegates the campaign eventually wins.
Rather than being a state with no preference vote that no one pays attention to, Colorado becomes a real delegate prize for the campaigns who are able to organize there. Those that gain an organizational advantage -- and that is much more likely in a low turnout election without the incentive of a presidential preference vote -- have a real opportunity to get something out of the Centennial state. It will not necessarily entail candidates coming into the state over the course March and into April (because forcing delegate candidates through to the county assembly level is the true mark of winning there), but it may make the media outlets pay continued attention to Colorado as the process there resolves itself. And since there is no preference vote guiding the delegate allocation process from step to step, a candidate could dominate in Colorado and come out on April 9 with a significant majority of delegates.
This rules set up means Colorado could go a lot of ways, but like some of the other states with, say, vote thresholds to qualify for delegates, the method in Colorado is likely to favor a limited number of candidates.
--
Colorado delegates will be bound to the candidates to whom they have pledged on the first ballot at the national convention. The exceptions are 1) if the delegate candidate filed as uncommitted and 2) if a presidential candidate has withdrawn from the race (thus releasing any delegates). In both cases, those delegates would be free to choose from among the candidates still in the race. Left unsaid is how those votes are cast at the convention. If all delegates end up bound, the chairperson of the party casts the votes of the delegation according to the pledges in the intent to run forms. However, in the event that there is a faction of uncommitted and/or released delegates, then it is the delegates themselves who cast their own ballots.
--
State allocation rules are archived here.
--
1 In the conventional sense, candidates will not necessarily come to Colorado to drive up support for a March 1 vote that will not happen. That is doubly true in light of the fact that Colorado shares its precinct caucuses date with primaries and caucuses in 13 other states. Functionally though, with delegates potentially on the line, Colorado is certainly not a non-event.
Sunday, August 30, 2015
Colorado Republicans' Preference-less Caucuses and the Delegate Binding Conundrum
Late last week, the Colorado Republican Party executive committee unanimously voted to hold caucuses next year but to do so without a presidential preference vote. The opening precinct caucuses across the Centennial state would initiate the delegate selection process, but not include a vote on which to base the binding of those delegates to the national convention. In part, that was intended to allow Colorado Republicans the latitude to conduct those caucuses as early as February 2, but also to keep the overall process as consistent with the past standard operating procedure the state party has traditionally utilized.
That party protocol has been to keep the delegation to the national convention unbound (though not necessarily unpledged/unaligned to particular candidates). A change in the Republican National Committee delegate selection rules for the 2016 cycle, however, necessitated some change in the state party rules in Colorado. Either the party could hold caucuses with a presidential preference vote that would bind the delegates to particular candidates, or it could seemingly reduce its role in the nomination process by removing the preference vote altogether as a means of skirting the binding provisions (in order to maintain an unbound delegation at the Cleveland convention).
Colorado Republicans have chosen the latter.
Yet, one of FHQ's reactions to this change was that this was possibly only part of the process of changing the rules. Executive committees tend to make/recommend changes but state central committees ultimately ratify them. The Colorado Republican rules change has cleared the first barrier but not the second. This has been underreported to this point, but was made quite clear in former Colorado Republican Party chair, Dick Wadhams', op-ed response to the decision to eliminate the caucus's preference vote.1 Wadhams was asking for reconsideration of the unanimous executive committee vote at the state central committee meeting next month.
And the party may be headed in that direction if Colorado's Republican National Committeeman, Mike Kopp, is to be believed. Kopp, who was not present for the executive committee vote last week told the Denver Post's John Frank that the decision to eliminate the preference vote at the caucuses was based on a misinterpretation of the RNC delegate selection rules.
There is a lot that does not add up about that conclusion and/or the process from which it was derived. First, FHQ spoke with Frank about his initial story concerning the preference vote decision. In our discussion, Frank mentioned that he had spoken with someone at the RNC and that the party had said that the decision out of Colorado was "rules compliant". Second, Kopp may not have been at the executive committee meeting, but FHQ is hard-pressed to imagine that there was no forewarning -- no agenda -- about what would transpire. The Colorado Republican Party informed FHQ in late July that the rules for 2016 would be considered at a late August executive committee meeting and finalized at a late September state central committee meeting. This could not or should not have come to a surprise to either the RNC or one of the Colorado representatives in the body.
That is perhaps a long way of saying that FHQ does not buy the "misinterpretation" angle in this instance. It feels more like there is some back channel pressure from the RNC for Colorado to bind the delegates, and that, in the near term, it is ex post facto being called a state-level misinterpretation.
This really is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things (of the Republican nomination, for instance). FHQ is not here to piece together some wild conspiracy theory or cover up story. Rather, this Colorado example is indicative of a broader question that has popped up periodically, but persistently throughout 2015.
Not a Uniquely Colorado Issue
Colorado Republicans are not alone. The addition of a Republican binding requirement for the 2016 cycle has been a problem almost since it was added in 2012 at Tampa and amended in April 2013. The binding requirement itself has been problematic because some Republicans both rank-and-file and within state parties have balked at being forced to bind delegates to candidates based on primary or caucus votes. The position of the RNC has traditionally been to leave that discretion up to the states. Asking the states to give up that latitude, then, is by its nature a problem to some. Giving up power in politics is never easy.
But that is only part of the picture in Colorado and elsewhere. The binding requirement is described in Rule 16(a)(1), but it is that rule in combination with Rule 16(a)(2) that has served as a real chokepoint in the state-level decision-making in response to the national party rules change as well as the interpretation of how it will be implemented. 16(a)(1) lays out the binding requirement, but 16(a)(2) describes how that will translate to an actual delegate count at the convention.
Let's look at the language of the latter component -- Rule 16(a)(2) -- before proceeding:
Still, questions linger. The main one is just how strict the RNC is going to be in its own interpretation of these rules at the convention. There, we have a few clues, but also quite a bit of ambiguity. Will, for instance, the RNC strictly adhere to that passage in the rules and count up the delegates as a direct reflection of the primary and caucus results? If so, that makes the doomsday, Rule 40 fueled convention scenarios Dave Catanese and Reid Wilson recently described.2 Instead, though, will the RNC take a more relaxed approach to following that binding mechanism at the convention? That relaxed approach might look as it traditionally has. In other words, as candidates withdraw from the race, they release any acquired delegates, thus making them unbound free agents at the convention. Those free agent delegates would be difficult to fit into the Rule 16(a)(2) strictures. The delegate in that scenario has no "obligation".
The thing is, there is no real guidance in the rules about the release of delegates as traditionally practiced or otherwise. Absent that, there is confusion once a new rule like the binding requirement is introduced. How do states react? How do they respond with rules changes to delegate selection rules at the state level?
Again, there are some clues as to the position of the RNC on this. Colorado Republican National Committeeman Kopp mentioned this in his comments to John Frank at the Denver Post that part of the misinterpretation within the Colorado GOP was that, "You can unbind your delegates if the candidate is no longer in the race."
That may be true, but that is not a message that is clearly conveyed in the national party rules or universally known by state parties in the wake of the binding rule's addition for 2016. That has led to some guessing and second guessing at the state level and among those following along with the process in terms of interpreting the rules and crafting compliant rules for state level processes. It is that kind of ambiguity that introduces potentially significant variation in how states respond.
Now, throw on top of that the October 1 RNC deadline to complete delegate selection rules and the uncertainty of the moment and one ends up with a messy context in which to craft rules.3 That late deadline means that state parties are finalizing their rules when attention to the campaign is ramping up. And during this 2016 cycle that translates to an extra dose of uncertainty -- whether just perceived or real -- given how large the field is, how wide open the nomination appears.
If you are at the state level attempting to craft rules in a time of uncertainty for an uncertain future, how do you gameplan? It is not easy and states certainly do not want to box themselves in on any of the nomination proceedings (delegate count, voice at the convention, etc.) through rules they themselves have made.
From an institutional standpoint, there really is some value in having rules in place early. The Democratic National Committee, by contrast, requires the submission of delegate selection plans for review in May the year before a presidential election year. Those states are then locked into their plans after approval in the summer (unless matters outside of the state party's control change. i.e.: a state legislature changing the date of a primary election). There are drawbacks to that too -- limitations on what can actually be changed late -- but there is something to having in place and sticking with a set a rules.
It creates some certainty in a process where that can often be lacking.
Come 2016, all of this may not matter in the slightest. However, it is something to bear in mind as the remaining state parties are finalizing the rules that will govern their delegate selection processes over the next month (before that October 1 deadline). Their collective perceptions of where this race is going or might go, in Colorado and elsewhere, will have an impact on the resulting rules.
--
1 Of note is that Wadhams oversaw the addition of the preference vote to the delegate selection process as chair during the lead up to the 2008 presidential nomination process. It is noteworthy both because Wadhams seemingly has a dog in this fight, but also because the caucuses to that point in time did not include a preference vote. To be quite clear here, Colorado returned to the caucus format for 2004 after three consecutive cycles of having a state-funded presidential primary election. Of course, preference only counts when there is a competitive nomination race. Before 1992 -- when the primary system began -- there were only three instances in which there was true competition for the Republican nomination: 1976, 1980 and 1988. In the post-reform era, then, Colorado Republicans have held some form of a caucus/convention system without a preference vote four times (out of 11 total post-reform cycles, seven competitive Republican nomination cycles).
2 The short version of this that has gained some steam in some Republican circles is that because Rule 40 requires a candidate to have a majority of delegates from at least eight states to have his or her name placed in nomination, a large field of candidates and few truly winner-take-all contests makes a messy convention an almost certainty. That is one interpretation. FHQ has held off on commenting about this, but will get to it at some point. In the context of an already long post is not that point.
3 Some states have already completed this rules-making process (see Nevada), but quite a few others, including Colorado, have not.
That party protocol has been to keep the delegation to the national convention unbound (though not necessarily unpledged/unaligned to particular candidates). A change in the Republican National Committee delegate selection rules for the 2016 cycle, however, necessitated some change in the state party rules in Colorado. Either the party could hold caucuses with a presidential preference vote that would bind the delegates to particular candidates, or it could seemingly reduce its role in the nomination process by removing the preference vote altogether as a means of skirting the binding provisions (in order to maintain an unbound delegation at the Cleveland convention).
Colorado Republicans have chosen the latter.
Yet, one of FHQ's reactions to this change was that this was possibly only part of the process of changing the rules. Executive committees tend to make/recommend changes but state central committees ultimately ratify them. The Colorado Republican rules change has cleared the first barrier but not the second. This has been underreported to this point, but was made quite clear in former Colorado Republican Party chair, Dick Wadhams', op-ed response to the decision to eliminate the caucus's preference vote.1 Wadhams was asking for reconsideration of the unanimous executive committee vote at the state central committee meeting next month.
And the party may be headed in that direction if Colorado's Republican National Committeeman, Mike Kopp, is to be believed. Kopp, who was not present for the executive committee vote last week told the Denver Post's John Frank that the decision to eliminate the preference vote at the caucuses was based on a misinterpretation of the RNC delegate selection rules.
There is a lot that does not add up about that conclusion and/or the process from which it was derived. First, FHQ spoke with Frank about his initial story concerning the preference vote decision. In our discussion, Frank mentioned that he had spoken with someone at the RNC and that the party had said that the decision out of Colorado was "rules compliant". Second, Kopp may not have been at the executive committee meeting, but FHQ is hard-pressed to imagine that there was no forewarning -- no agenda -- about what would transpire. The Colorado Republican Party informed FHQ in late July that the rules for 2016 would be considered at a late August executive committee meeting and finalized at a late September state central committee meeting. This could not or should not have come to a surprise to either the RNC or one of the Colorado representatives in the body.
That is perhaps a long way of saying that FHQ does not buy the "misinterpretation" angle in this instance. It feels more like there is some back channel pressure from the RNC for Colorado to bind the delegates, and that, in the near term, it is ex post facto being called a state-level misinterpretation.
This really is neither here nor there in the grand scheme of things (of the Republican nomination, for instance). FHQ is not here to piece together some wild conspiracy theory or cover up story. Rather, this Colorado example is indicative of a broader question that has popped up periodically, but persistently throughout 2015.
Not a Uniquely Colorado Issue
Colorado Republicans are not alone. The addition of a Republican binding requirement for the 2016 cycle has been a problem almost since it was added in 2012 at Tampa and amended in April 2013. The binding requirement itself has been problematic because some Republicans both rank-and-file and within state parties have balked at being forced to bind delegates to candidates based on primary or caucus votes. The position of the RNC has traditionally been to leave that discretion up to the states. Asking the states to give up that latitude, then, is by its nature a problem to some. Giving up power in politics is never easy.
But that is only part of the picture in Colorado and elsewhere. The binding requirement is described in Rule 16(a)(1), but it is that rule in combination with Rule 16(a)(2) that has served as a real chokepoint in the state-level decision-making in response to the national party rules change as well as the interpretation of how it will be implemented. 16(a)(1) lays out the binding requirement, but 16(a)(2) describes how that will translate to an actual delegate count at the convention.
Let's look at the language of the latter component -- Rule 16(a)(2) -- before proceeding:
The Secretary of the Convention shall faithfully announce and record each delegate’s vote in accordance with the delegate’s obligation under these rules, state law or state party rule. If any delegate bound by these rules, state party rule or state law to vote for a presidential candidate at the national convention demonstrates support under Rule 40 for any person other than the candidate to whom he or she is bound, such support shall not be recognized. Except as provided for by state law or state party rule, no presidential candidate shall have the power to remove a delegate.The intent behind the addition of this rule and its amended version was to tamp down on some of the perceived mischief at the Tampa convention during the roll call vote. The quickest, easiest way to do that is to set up some form of binding mechanism with some modicum of enforcement. Rule 16(a) seems to accomplish both.
Still, questions linger. The main one is just how strict the RNC is going to be in its own interpretation of these rules at the convention. There, we have a few clues, but also quite a bit of ambiguity. Will, for instance, the RNC strictly adhere to that passage in the rules and count up the delegates as a direct reflection of the primary and caucus results? If so, that makes the doomsday, Rule 40 fueled convention scenarios Dave Catanese and Reid Wilson recently described.2 Instead, though, will the RNC take a more relaxed approach to following that binding mechanism at the convention? That relaxed approach might look as it traditionally has. In other words, as candidates withdraw from the race, they release any acquired delegates, thus making them unbound free agents at the convention. Those free agent delegates would be difficult to fit into the Rule 16(a)(2) strictures. The delegate in that scenario has no "obligation".
The thing is, there is no real guidance in the rules about the release of delegates as traditionally practiced or otherwise. Absent that, there is confusion once a new rule like the binding requirement is introduced. How do states react? How do they respond with rules changes to delegate selection rules at the state level?
Again, there are some clues as to the position of the RNC on this. Colorado Republican National Committeeman Kopp mentioned this in his comments to John Frank at the Denver Post that part of the misinterpretation within the Colorado GOP was that, "You can unbind your delegates if the candidate is no longer in the race."
That may be true, but that is not a message that is clearly conveyed in the national party rules or universally known by state parties in the wake of the binding rule's addition for 2016. That has led to some guessing and second guessing at the state level and among those following along with the process in terms of interpreting the rules and crafting compliant rules for state level processes. It is that kind of ambiguity that introduces potentially significant variation in how states respond.
Now, throw on top of that the October 1 RNC deadline to complete delegate selection rules and the uncertainty of the moment and one ends up with a messy context in which to craft rules.3 That late deadline means that state parties are finalizing their rules when attention to the campaign is ramping up. And during this 2016 cycle that translates to an extra dose of uncertainty -- whether just perceived or real -- given how large the field is, how wide open the nomination appears.
If you are at the state level attempting to craft rules in a time of uncertainty for an uncertain future, how do you gameplan? It is not easy and states certainly do not want to box themselves in on any of the nomination proceedings (delegate count, voice at the convention, etc.) through rules they themselves have made.
From an institutional standpoint, there really is some value in having rules in place early. The Democratic National Committee, by contrast, requires the submission of delegate selection plans for review in May the year before a presidential election year. Those states are then locked into their plans after approval in the summer (unless matters outside of the state party's control change. i.e.: a state legislature changing the date of a primary election). There are drawbacks to that too -- limitations on what can actually be changed late -- but there is something to having in place and sticking with a set a rules.
It creates some certainty in a process where that can often be lacking.
Come 2016, all of this may not matter in the slightest. However, it is something to bear in mind as the remaining state parties are finalizing the rules that will govern their delegate selection processes over the next month (before that October 1 deadline). Their collective perceptions of where this race is going or might go, in Colorado and elsewhere, will have an impact on the resulting rules.
--
1 Of note is that Wadhams oversaw the addition of the preference vote to the delegate selection process as chair during the lead up to the 2008 presidential nomination process. It is noteworthy both because Wadhams seemingly has a dog in this fight, but also because the caucuses to that point in time did not include a preference vote. To be quite clear here, Colorado returned to the caucus format for 2004 after three consecutive cycles of having a state-funded presidential primary election. Of course, preference only counts when there is a competitive nomination race. Before 1992 -- when the primary system began -- there were only three instances in which there was true competition for the Republican nomination: 1976, 1980 and 1988. In the post-reform era, then, Colorado Republicans have held some form of a caucus/convention system without a preference vote four times (out of 11 total post-reform cycles, seven competitive Republican nomination cycles).
2 The short version of this that has gained some steam in some Republican circles is that because Rule 40 requires a candidate to have a majority of delegates from at least eight states to have his or her name placed in nomination, a large field of candidates and few truly winner-take-all contests makes a messy convention an almost certainty. That is one interpretation. FHQ has held off on commenting about this, but will get to it at some point. In the context of an already long post is not that point.
3 Some states have already completed this rules-making process (see Nevada), but quite a few others, including Colorado, have not.
Wednesday, June 10, 2015
March 1 a Go for Colorado Democratic Caucuses in 2016
A few weeks ago, the Colorado Democratic Party released a draft of its 2016 delegate selection plan.1 Following the failed attempt at the close of the 2015 state legislative session to switch from a caucus/convention system to a more open primary system, both parties were essentially locked into caucuses and Colorado Democrats have selected March 1 for the date on which to hold their "first determining step" caucuses.
Parties in Colorado have two possible dates on which they can conduct precinct caucuses (with a presidential preference vote): the first Tuesday in February or the first Tuesday in March. The former is an option added for the 2008 cycle to allow the state parties the latitude to opt into a date that would be early enough to at the very least keep the Colorado caucuses in line with the logjam of states holding contests on February 5, Super Tuesday in 2008. As 2012 approached, the February option remained in state law, but the March option was pushed up a couple of weeks from the third to first Tuesday in March.
That meant that the second, later option was in line with the earliest date allowed on the informally coordinated calendar structure the national parties had devised for the 2012 cycle; the first Tuesday in March. It also meant that the caucuses date choice allowed by Colorado law was basically an optionless option. The national party delegate selection rules in 2012 prohibited February contests (with some loopholes and nose-thumbing states). Colorado Democrats settled on the March option in 2011 and have done so again in 2015 for the 2016 presidential election cycle.
Though non-binding caucuses technically allowed Colorado Republicans to hold February 7 caucuses in 2012 without penalty from the Republican National Committee, the new 2016 rules requiring the binding of delegates (based on the earliest, statewide vote) limits Republicans in the Centennial state in a way they were not in 2011. It also means that Colorado Republicans would be vulnerable to the more severe penalties the RNC introduced for 2016. Still, the option exists, but it is a decision for another time.
For now, Colorado Democrats are headed for March 1 caucuses. That places Colorado caucusgoers behind only Nevadans on the calendar in western state voting.
--
1 The above link is to the plan from the Colorado Democratic Party site. FHQ will also keep a version of the plan here.
Parties in Colorado have two possible dates on which they can conduct precinct caucuses (with a presidential preference vote): the first Tuesday in February or the first Tuesday in March. The former is an option added for the 2008 cycle to allow the state parties the latitude to opt into a date that would be early enough to at the very least keep the Colorado caucuses in line with the logjam of states holding contests on February 5, Super Tuesday in 2008. As 2012 approached, the February option remained in state law, but the March option was pushed up a couple of weeks from the third to first Tuesday in March.
That meant that the second, later option was in line with the earliest date allowed on the informally coordinated calendar structure the national parties had devised for the 2012 cycle; the first Tuesday in March. It also meant that the caucuses date choice allowed by Colorado law was basically an optionless option. The national party delegate selection rules in 2012 prohibited February contests (with some loopholes and nose-thumbing states). Colorado Democrats settled on the March option in 2011 and have done so again in 2015 for the 2016 presidential election cycle.
Though non-binding caucuses technically allowed Colorado Republicans to hold February 7 caucuses in 2012 without penalty from the Republican National Committee, the new 2016 rules requiring the binding of delegates (based on the earliest, statewide vote) limits Republicans in the Centennial state in a way they were not in 2011. It also means that Colorado Republicans would be vulnerable to the more severe penalties the RNC introduced for 2016. Still, the option exists, but it is a decision for another time.
For now, Colorado Democrats are headed for March 1 caucuses. That places Colorado caucusgoers behind only Nevadans on the calendar in western state voting.
--
1 The above link is to the plan from the Colorado Democratic Party site. FHQ will also keep a version of the plan here.
Tuesday, April 10, 2012
Cart Before the Horse: Pennsylvania/Colorado Edition
FHQ realizes that the desire is to jump to the next seemingly consequential contest in the Republican presidential nomination race. And with 72 unbound delegates -- directly and blindly selected on the April 24 primary ballot1 -- on the line in the home state of the current number two in the overall delegate count, that is not entirely unwarranted. [Mostly unwarranted, but not entirely.] But to the folks who said after last week's three contests in Maryland, Washington, DC and Wisconsin that there were no contests between now and April 24, well, there are.
...and contests with delegates on the line.
Sure, one could argue that Colorado has already had its turn in the spotlight, but with district and state assemblies later this week in the Centennial state -- contests that will actually select delegates to attend the Republican National Convention in Tampa -- it means more now than in the earlier non-binding straw poll.2 Of the 36 Colorado delegates, 21 will be on the line in congressional district assemblies on April 12-13 and 12 more (at-large delegates) will be at stake at the state assembly on April 14. The remaining three delegates are automatic delegates who are free to endorse/pledge to whichever candidate they choose. However, both the national committeeman and national committeewoman -- two of the automatic delegates -- will be elected at the state convention as well.
Looking at the precinct caucuses straw poll results, the inclination is to assume -- as the AP has done -- that Rick Santorum will emerge with more delegates. Of course, this ignores the rules of delegate selection in Colorado.3 Now, while the RNC will likely continue to consider the Colorado delegates unbound even after this weekend, this overlooks the fact that, in a change from the 2008 rules, the Colorado Republican Party is allowing delegate candidates to officially pledge themselves to a candidate. Additionally, that pledge is binding through one ballot at the national convention (...or until said candidate is no longer in the race). [That sounds an awful lot like a bound delegate. As such, this will be an interesting test case in terms of the RNC delegate count. The RNC has already counted the Illinois delegates, though technically unbound, toward both Romney's and Santorum's totals. Those delegates were filed as supporters of the candidates and elected directly on the March 20 primary ballot.]
What this means is that the delegate candidates in Colorado are who we need to look at and not the straw poll results from February 7. By that measure, it looks as if Mitt Romney will emerge victorious in the Colorado delegate count. The former Massachusetts governor has more at-large delegate candidates pledged to him than any other candidate and more pledged congressional district delegates in five of the seven Colorado congressional districts.
The leader in the other two congressional districts, you might be surprised to find out, is Ron Paul and not Rick Santorum. [Perhaps that autopsy should live on.]
Now, before we get into possible Santorum-Paul alliances to prevent Mitt Romney from overperforming his straw poll numbers in another non-binding caucus state, there is another wildcard to discuss: unpledged delegates. The Colorado Republican Party may have changed the rules regarding the pledging/binding of delegates compared to the 2008 cycle, but that never meant that delegates had to run as pledged to a particular candidate. They don't. In fact, if "Unpledged" was a candidate, he or she would be the frontrunner to emerge with the most delegates from Colorado. With the exception of the first congressional district, there are more unpledged delegates than pledged delegates in the six other congressional districts and statewide (at-large). The race to determine/sway the preferences of those delegates will play an outsized role in the selection of delegates in the congressional district and state conventions later this week.
NOTES:
1 FHQ will have more on the Pennsylvania Republican delegate selection system some other time. Suffice it to say, it will not be the easiest contest in which to gauge some measure of victory for a candidate or candidates. ...as if Rick Santorum needed any more hills to climb in the quest to keep Mitt Romney from 1144.
2 Yes, from a momentum standpoint, binding or not, the Colorado win along with Minnesota and Missouri wins helped make Rick Santorum relevant again for the contests -- particularly Michigan -- later in February. That didn't stop the Romney campaign from retorting that Santorum got no delegates out of his February 7 victories.
3 I suppose it helps that the AP (via the New York Times) adds the very fine print that Colorado is non-binding and the delegate allocation for the state is just a projection. It would be perhaps less misleading if they didn't project the delegates at all. See North Dakota.
Recent Posts:
Maine Legislature Exploring Presidential Primary Option for 2016
More on Santorum Delegate Math and Some Thoughts on Texas as Winner-Take-All
Race to 1144: MD, DC & WI Primaries
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
...and contests with delegates on the line.
Sure, one could argue that Colorado has already had its turn in the spotlight, but with district and state assemblies later this week in the Centennial state -- contests that will actually select delegates to attend the Republican National Convention in Tampa -- it means more now than in the earlier non-binding straw poll.2 Of the 36 Colorado delegates, 21 will be on the line in congressional district assemblies on April 12-13 and 12 more (at-large delegates) will be at stake at the state assembly on April 14. The remaining three delegates are automatic delegates who are free to endorse/pledge to whichever candidate they choose. However, both the national committeeman and national committeewoman -- two of the automatic delegates -- will be elected at the state convention as well.
Looking at the precinct caucuses straw poll results, the inclination is to assume -- as the AP has done -- that Rick Santorum will emerge with more delegates. Of course, this ignores the rules of delegate selection in Colorado.3 Now, while the RNC will likely continue to consider the Colorado delegates unbound even after this weekend, this overlooks the fact that, in a change from the 2008 rules, the Colorado Republican Party is allowing delegate candidates to officially pledge themselves to a candidate. Additionally, that pledge is binding through one ballot at the national convention (...or until said candidate is no longer in the race). [That sounds an awful lot like a bound delegate. As such, this will be an interesting test case in terms of the RNC delegate count. The RNC has already counted the Illinois delegates, though technically unbound, toward both Romney's and Santorum's totals. Those delegates were filed as supporters of the candidates and elected directly on the March 20 primary ballot.]
What this means is that the delegate candidates in Colorado are who we need to look at and not the straw poll results from February 7. By that measure, it looks as if Mitt Romney will emerge victorious in the Colorado delegate count. The former Massachusetts governor has more at-large delegate candidates pledged to him than any other candidate and more pledged congressional district delegates in five of the seven Colorado congressional districts.
The leader in the other two congressional districts, you might be surprised to find out, is Ron Paul and not Rick Santorum. [Perhaps that autopsy should live on.]
Now, before we get into possible Santorum-Paul alliances to prevent Mitt Romney from overperforming his straw poll numbers in another non-binding caucus state, there is another wildcard to discuss: unpledged delegates. The Colorado Republican Party may have changed the rules regarding the pledging/binding of delegates compared to the 2008 cycle, but that never meant that delegates had to run as pledged to a particular candidate. They don't. In fact, if "Unpledged" was a candidate, he or she would be the frontrunner to emerge with the most delegates from Colorado. With the exception of the first congressional district, there are more unpledged delegates than pledged delegates in the six other congressional districts and statewide (at-large). The race to determine/sway the preferences of those delegates will play an outsized role in the selection of delegates in the congressional district and state conventions later this week.
NOTES:
- As Jon Bernstein pointed out yesterday, though this race is effectively over, the fact that none of the remaining three candidates other than Romney has dropped out -- and by all accounts have no plans to in the near term -- provides us with a nice glimpse into the mechanics of Republican caucus/convention systems in a somewhat competitive environment. It is a helpful exercise to observe what happens -- particularly in light of the projections made based on the February 7 straw poll.
- To get back to those latent Santorum-Paul delegate alliances, it is an open question as to whether such coalitions are to the candidates' benefit. On the one hand both could strategically align with each other to prevent Romney from winning the most delegates on either the congressional district level or at the state convention. But on the other hand, the margins are not that great between each candidate individually and Mitt Romney -- statewide or in any of the seven congressional districts -- that the persuasion of some of the unpledged delegates could not be overcome. In fact, FHQ would hypothesize that, at least initially, a Darwinian struggle for the votes of those unpledged delegates would be the optimal strategy for each of the campaigns. But this is a more dynamic process than "form a coalition" or "go-it-alone" for Paul and Santorum (or Romney for that matter). The struggle may be where this starts, but again, there is a difference between delegate selection and delegate binding. And there are no rules to guide this process in Colorado. Nothing has to be proportional to the straw poll vote or the vote at that district or state convention. Nor does the allocation have to be winner-take-all. It could be either, but neither is required by rule. Much, then, will depend on the method of voting. Is it an open Darwinian struggle -- of sorts -- like the Iowa Democratic caucuses or is/are a secret ballot vote(s) taken to determine overall preference and delegates chosen accordingly? We don't know.
- Of course, with more than one congressional district, Colorado will be different from North Dakota. The Colorado GOP may put forth a slate of at-large delegates at the state convention -- that doesn't appear to be the case -- but that is a much more difficult enterprise from above and outside of the congressional district conventions.
- That has not stopped at least some from crying shenanigans. Romney's delegates will be the first listed on the ballot (...based on national delegate count order).
- This means a lot less with Santorum suspending his campaign. Consider the experiment in semi-competitive Republican caucus states over.
1 FHQ will have more on the Pennsylvania Republican delegate selection system some other time. Suffice it to say, it will not be the easiest contest in which to gauge some measure of victory for a candidate or candidates. ...as if Rick Santorum needed any more hills to climb in the quest to keep Mitt Romney from 1144.
2 Yes, from a momentum standpoint, binding or not, the Colorado win along with Minnesota and Missouri wins helped make Rick Santorum relevant again for the contests -- particularly Michigan -- later in February. That didn't stop the Romney campaign from retorting that Santorum got no delegates out of his February 7 victories.
3 I suppose it helps that the AP (via the New York Times) adds the very fine print that Colorado is non-binding and the delegate allocation for the state is just a projection. It would be perhaps less misleading if they didn't project the delegates at all. See North Dakota.
Recent Posts:
Maine Legislature Exploring Presidential Primary Option for 2016
More on Santorum Delegate Math and Some Thoughts on Texas as Winner-Take-All
Race to 1144: MD, DC & WI Primaries
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Monday, October 7, 2019
For 2020, Colorado Republican Delegate Allocation Rules Seemingly at Odds with RNC Rules
Back in the lead up to the 2012 presidential primary season, the Republican National Committee (RNC) instituted a new set of rules governing the presidential nomination process. The changes for that cycle put in place a later start time to primary season (reserving February for the four carve-out state contests), but also added a new wrinkle to how state parties could allocate delegates based on the results a primary or caucus.
The latter of those national party-level restrictions on the activities of state parties required that states with primaries and caucuses in or before March allocate delegates in a proportional manner. Now, in the time since that point, the RNC has redefined what proportional means and decreased the size of the window of the calendar in which winner-take-all rules are prohibited. But that proportionality window still exists. State parties with contests before March 15 have to set in place rules that proportionally allocate national convention delegates.
Yes, that is a more restrictive national party mandate than has historically been the case in the Republican process. However, state parties are not without some latitude. They have some discretion. For one, state parties can add a delegate qualifying threshold of up to 20 percent which can greatly restrict the number of candidates who receive delegates (especially in a cycle in which an incumbent president is seeking renomination).
State parties also have the option of splitting up the allocation of different types of delegates. At-large delegate allocation can be tethered to statewide result while congressional district delegates can be awarded to candidates based on their performance in those subunits within a given state.
Finally, even in the proportionality window that opens the presidential primary calendar under the RNC rules, state parties have the option of adding a winner-take-all trigger for candidates who win a majority or more of the vote statewide. Massachusetts Republicans, for example, added a winner-take-all trigger to their delegate selection rules for their Super Tuesday primary in 2020. And that is not uncommon for states with contests in the proportionality window. Most, in fact, have winner-take-all triggers in their plans.
In other words, state parties have options to tilt the allocation in a winner-take-all direction on the early calendar and still remain in compliance with RNC rules.
Perhaps that is an overwrought preface, but it is laid out in advance of a possible rules violation by one state party ahead of the 2020 cycle. Last week -- on or before October 1 -- state Republican parties were to have finalized and submitted to the RNC their delegate selection plans for 2020. And the bylaws of the Colorado Republican Party appear to violate the proportionality mandate from the RNC for the party's 2020 presidential primary (newly reestablished for the 2020 cycle).
Much of this potential conflict can be traced to the late March 2019 state central committee meeting of the Colorado Republican Party. The state party chair election dominated the headlines coming out of that meeting, but that was not the only piece of business on the committee's agenda that weekend. They also considered changes to the 2020 delegate selection rules.
In light of the new presidential primary in the Centennial state, a proposal came before the committee to streamline the delegate selection process. And it should be noted that Colorado Republicans are constrained not only by national party rules but state law as well. RNC rules require that delegate allocation be based on the earliest statewide contest and the new Colorado law concerning the presidential primary purposefully schedule caucuses in the state for after the primary (the Saturday after). The caucuses (and any attendant presidential preference vote) would follow the vote in the primary. The Colorado Republican Party, then, is basically stuck using the primary for allocating delegates.
Part of the rules changes on delegate allocation at the state central committee meeting in March addressed that. Struck from the rules at the time was a contingency for allocation depending upon whether there was a primary or caucus. Now that section of the bylaws simply refers to the results of the Colorado Presidential Primary.
Also struck from the old rules, however, was guidance on who -- which candidates -- would qualify for delegates in the event that Colorado held a presidential primary. The old rules, and this other section that was struck from them, allocated delegates to candidates who received 15 percent or more of the vote in the presidential primary. Again, that is consistent with RNC proportionality requirements for states with primaries or caucuses before March 15 and was part of the 2016 rules Colorado Republicans used (but there was no presidential primary).
But that guidance is now gone, and in its place is this language on delegate allocation and binding:
That appears to be a violation of RNC rules restricting delegate allocation in early calendar contests.
However, there are a couple of caveats.
First, the next rule in the sequence after those listed above does give the state central committee the ability create rules governing the selection of delegates that are consistent with both the bylaws and RNC rules on or before October 1 in the year prior to a presidential election. The above winner-take-all provision, then, is just a baseline. But one that conflicts with national party rules given the position of the Colorado primary on the calendar.
In addition, the process by which delegates are selected requires them to align (or remain unpledged) with a candidate. The RNC legal counsel interpretation of the RNC rules in 2016 was that that alignment -- pledging to a candidate upon filing to be a delegate candidate -- bound that delegate candidate to their presidential preference. And that Colorado selection procedure is still in rules for 2020. Whether the RNC legal counsel still interprets the RNC rules the same in 2020 as was the case in 2016 remains to be seen.
Regardless, any delegates selected at the state convention or in congressional district conventions aligned with candidates other than the winner of the presidential primary in Colorado would likely be bound to those candidates at the national convention. But that would only be the case if that candidate was still in the race and had his or her name placed in nomination at the convention. That, too, seems a stretch in a year in which an incumbent Republican president (still popular within the party) is up for renomination. But any such delegates would become free agents and could support another candidate.
Finally, the secretary of state in Colorado also has the option of canceling the presidential primary if there is no competition. That has to be done by January 3, 2020. But the bar for ballot access to the Colorado primary is quite low for prospective candidates: $500 fee or 500 signatures.
Colorado, then, will likely have a Republican presidential primary on March 3, and because of those caveats above, likely will not allocate delegates in a winner-take-all manner.
...unless the party has added a winner-take-all trigger as other states have done.
--
Follow FHQ on Twitter and Facebook or subscribe by Email.
The latter of those national party-level restrictions on the activities of state parties required that states with primaries and caucuses in or before March allocate delegates in a proportional manner. Now, in the time since that point, the RNC has redefined what proportional means and decreased the size of the window of the calendar in which winner-take-all rules are prohibited. But that proportionality window still exists. State parties with contests before March 15 have to set in place rules that proportionally allocate national convention delegates.
Yes, that is a more restrictive national party mandate than has historically been the case in the Republican process. However, state parties are not without some latitude. They have some discretion. For one, state parties can add a delegate qualifying threshold of up to 20 percent which can greatly restrict the number of candidates who receive delegates (especially in a cycle in which an incumbent president is seeking renomination).
State parties also have the option of splitting up the allocation of different types of delegates. At-large delegate allocation can be tethered to statewide result while congressional district delegates can be awarded to candidates based on their performance in those subunits within a given state.
Finally, even in the proportionality window that opens the presidential primary calendar under the RNC rules, state parties have the option of adding a winner-take-all trigger for candidates who win a majority or more of the vote statewide. Massachusetts Republicans, for example, added a winner-take-all trigger to their delegate selection rules for their Super Tuesday primary in 2020. And that is not uncommon for states with contests in the proportionality window. Most, in fact, have winner-take-all triggers in their plans.
In other words, state parties have options to tilt the allocation in a winner-take-all direction on the early calendar and still remain in compliance with RNC rules.
Perhaps that is an overwrought preface, but it is laid out in advance of a possible rules violation by one state party ahead of the 2020 cycle. Last week -- on or before October 1 -- state Republican parties were to have finalized and submitted to the RNC their delegate selection plans for 2020. And the bylaws of the Colorado Republican Party appear to violate the proportionality mandate from the RNC for the party's 2020 presidential primary (newly reestablished for the 2020 cycle).
Much of this potential conflict can be traced to the late March 2019 state central committee meeting of the Colorado Republican Party. The state party chair election dominated the headlines coming out of that meeting, but that was not the only piece of business on the committee's agenda that weekend. They also considered changes to the 2020 delegate selection rules.
In light of the new presidential primary in the Centennial state, a proposal came before the committee to streamline the delegate selection process. And it should be noted that Colorado Republicans are constrained not only by national party rules but state law as well. RNC rules require that delegate allocation be based on the earliest statewide contest and the new Colorado law concerning the presidential primary purposefully schedule caucuses in the state for after the primary (the Saturday after). The caucuses (and any attendant presidential preference vote) would follow the vote in the primary. The Colorado Republican Party, then, is basically stuck using the primary for allocating delegates.
Part of the rules changes on delegate allocation at the state central committee meeting in March addressed that. Struck from the rules at the time was a contingency for allocation depending upon whether there was a primary or caucus. Now that section of the bylaws simply refers to the results of the Colorado Presidential Primary.
Also struck from the old rules, however, was guidance on who -- which candidates -- would qualify for delegates in the event that Colorado held a presidential primary. The old rules, and this other section that was struck from them, allocated delegates to candidates who received 15 percent or more of the vote in the presidential primary. Again, that is consistent with RNC proportionality requirements for states with primaries or caucuses before March 15 and was part of the 2016 rules Colorado Republicans used (but there was no presidential primary).
But that guidance is now gone, and in its place is this language on delegate allocation and binding:
a. On the first nominating ballot for President, in accordance with State statute all members of the State’s delegation shall be bound to vote for the Presidential candidate who received the highest number of votes in the Colorado Presidential Primary, and the CRC Chairman acting as chair of the delegation, or his designee, shall announce that the entire vote of the State’s delegation is for that candidate. If that Presidential candidate releases his delegates through public declaration or written notification, the candidate's name is not placed in nomination, or the candidate does not otherwise qualify for nomination under the rules of the Republican National Convention, the individual National Delegates and National Alternate Delegates previously pledged are released to cast their ballots as each may choose. b. On any succeeding ballot for President and on all ballots for other purposes the individual delegates are released to cast their ballots as each may choose.[Emphasis added by FHQ]
That appears to be a violation of RNC rules restricting delegate allocation in early calendar contests.
However, there are a couple of caveats.
First, the next rule in the sequence after those listed above does give the state central committee the ability create rules governing the selection of delegates that are consistent with both the bylaws and RNC rules on or before October 1 in the year prior to a presidential election. The above winner-take-all provision, then, is just a baseline. But one that conflicts with national party rules given the position of the Colorado primary on the calendar.
In addition, the process by which delegates are selected requires them to align (or remain unpledged) with a candidate. The RNC legal counsel interpretation of the RNC rules in 2016 was that that alignment -- pledging to a candidate upon filing to be a delegate candidate -- bound that delegate candidate to their presidential preference. And that Colorado selection procedure is still in rules for 2020. Whether the RNC legal counsel still interprets the RNC rules the same in 2020 as was the case in 2016 remains to be seen.
Regardless, any delegates selected at the state convention or in congressional district conventions aligned with candidates other than the winner of the presidential primary in Colorado would likely be bound to those candidates at the national convention. But that would only be the case if that candidate was still in the race and had his or her name placed in nomination at the convention. That, too, seems a stretch in a year in which an incumbent Republican president (still popular within the party) is up for renomination. But any such delegates would become free agents and could support another candidate.
Finally, the secretary of state in Colorado also has the option of canceling the presidential primary if there is no competition. That has to be done by January 3, 2020. But the bar for ballot access to the Colorado primary is quite low for prospective candidates: $500 fee or 500 signatures.
Colorado, then, will likely have a Republican presidential primary on March 3, and because of those caveats above, likely will not allocate delegates in a winner-take-all manner.
...unless the party has added a winner-take-all trigger as other states have done.
--
Follow FHQ on Twitter and Facebook or subscribe by Email.
Monday, April 16, 2012
Mixed Results for Romney in First Contests Since Becoming Presumptive Nominee
If you were expecting a repeat of North Dakota in Colorado or Minnesota over the weekend in state and/or congressional district conventions, you were dealt a bit of a surprise.
Unlike what transpired in the Peace Garden state two weeks ago, presumptive Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, was unable to dominate the proceedings in either Colorado's state and congressional district conventions or in the three congressional district conventions in Minnesota's 3rd, 5th and 6th districts. Instead Romney was shut out in the North Star state, overperformed his statewide straw poll showing in the Colorado state convention, and broke even or was bested in the seven congressional district conventions in the Centennial state.
In Minnesota:
According to Minnesota Republican National Committeewoman Pat Anderson, Ron Paul swept all three congressional district conventions in the Land of 10,000 Lakes. Remember on February 7 when the twitterverse collectively scoffed at the the notion that Paul would get the "maximum number of delegates out of Minnesota"? FHQ filed that memory away. As of now, four congressional districts have held conventions. Paul adds nine from the past weekend's three conventions to the one delegate he received in the 7th district at the end of March.1 Half way through the congressional district delegate allocation, 83% of the delegates so far selected support Ron Paul. FHQ has been saying it since January, and we'll say it again: Ron Paul will get his delegates. Will he win the Republican nomination? No, but he will likely overshoot his delegate total from four years ago in St. Paul this summer in Tampa.
In Colorado:
Statewide:
In winning eight delegate spots out of 12 total at-large delegates, Mitt Romney outperformed his 35% straw poll share of the vote by almost 100%.2 In other words, had Colorado proportionally allocated its at-large delegates, Romney would have received just four delegates. On this particular weekend, this statewide (state convention) vote was the closest thing to North Dakota that was witnessed across two other (mostly) non-binding caucus states.
Congressional Districts:
Of all the candidates, Mitt Romney had the most delegates at five of the seven Colorado congressional district conventions. Of course, that overlooks the fact that there was a fairly significant cache of unpledged delegates across all seven districts. It also turns a blind eye to the reality that Santorum's and Paul's collective delegate strength was greater than Romney's in five of the seven districts. In those two districts where Romney outmatched the Paul/Santorum "team"3 -- the 3rd and 6th districts -- Romney won one and two delegates respectively. Unpledged delegates won the other two delegate positions in the 3rd and the other one in the 6th. It may, then, have been less about a collective effort between Paul and Santorum supporters than the majority of unpledged delegates in both of those districts.
What was truly strange was that Santorum won any of the congressional district delegates. He placed fourth in the number of congressional district convention delegates in the 1st (one delegate won) and 2nd (one delegate won), and third in the 4th (one delegate won), 5th (two delegates won), and 7th (one delegate won). No candidate received all three delegates from any of the seven congressional districts, but Santorum winning two delegates in a district where he finished behind "Unpledged" and Paul -- in that order -- was noteworthy the weekend after the former Pennsylvania senator suspended his campaign.
Meanwhile, it was perhaps even stranger that Ron Paul emerged from the Colorado district conventions with no pledged delegates. Many Paul supporters celebrated the overall unpledged victory, claiming that those are Ron Paul delegates. And with Santorum out, that may not necessarily be untrue, though Santorum delegates comprise six of the 20 total slots that were not either Romney delegates or automatic delegates in the Colorado delegation.
What, then, can we take away from the weekend?
For starters, this provides us with perhaps the polar opposite to what happened in North Dakota, where the state party put forth a delegate slate for vote before the entire state convention that was weighted toward Mitt Romney. Romney may or may not do well among the Minnesota at-large delegate slate, the Paul, Santorum and Gingrich supporters aren't rolling over and playing dead.
...even if Romney is the presumptive Republican nominee.
And again, this further fills out the picture of the connection between the straw poll results and the actual delegate allocation in the non-binding/unbound delegate caucus states. It may be that at some point everyone rallies behind Mitt Romney as the Republican nominee, but that is not happening yet as the state conventions for these caucus states roll around. North Dakota was evidence that the party (state or national) was willing that to be the case, but Colorado and Minnesota have given the counterargument: That the straw poll, or more to the point, the precinct caucuses are not entirely meaningless. There is no binding mechanism, but that does not mean that the delegates chosen to move from one round of the caucus/convention process are not devoid of presidential candidate preferences. The fallout from North Dakota and the results in Colorado and (so far in) Minnesota should speak to that. None of these allocations have been proportional to the straw poll results, nor have they been winner-take-all. They are the organic byproduct of the caucus/convention system; unbound by direct allocation rules.
The expectation is that Romney will likely move toward a consolidation of the vote in the remaining primary states, but these caucus states -- finishing up a process that was borne out of an earlier and competitive portion of this race -- will be worth watching. Delegates committed to the non-Romney candidates may continue to be for their candidates.
...or at least against the presumptive nominee as these processes run their course. Want a signal that the not-Romney voters and delegates have given up? Watch these delegate allocating state conventions as primaries continue to tip toward Romney.
--
1 Delegates supporting Rick Santorum took the other two slots.
2 Colorado Republican Party National Delegate Results:
Colorado Republican Party National Delegate Results
3 This was something that FHQ brought up last week in setting the stage for the Colorado delegate allocation.
Recent Posts:
Hey Hey, Ho Ho. This Romney Protest's Got to Go?
Santorum Suspends: A Nomination Race in Context
Cart Before the Horse: Pennsylvania/Colorado Edition
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Unlike what transpired in the Peace Garden state two weeks ago, presumptive Republican presidential nominee, Mitt Romney, was unable to dominate the proceedings in either Colorado's state and congressional district conventions or in the three congressional district conventions in Minnesota's 3rd, 5th and 6th districts. Instead Romney was shut out in the North Star state, overperformed his statewide straw poll showing in the Colorado state convention, and broke even or was bested in the seven congressional district conventions in the Centennial state.
In Minnesota:
According to Minnesota Republican National Committeewoman Pat Anderson, Ron Paul swept all three congressional district conventions in the Land of 10,000 Lakes. Remember on February 7 when the twitterverse collectively scoffed at the the notion that Paul would get the "maximum number of delegates out of Minnesota"? FHQ filed that memory away. As of now, four congressional districts have held conventions. Paul adds nine from the past weekend's three conventions to the one delegate he received in the 7th district at the end of March.1 Half way through the congressional district delegate allocation, 83% of the delegates so far selected support Ron Paul. FHQ has been saying it since January, and we'll say it again: Ron Paul will get his delegates. Will he win the Republican nomination? No, but he will likely overshoot his delegate total from four years ago in St. Paul this summer in Tampa.
In Colorado:
Statewide:
In winning eight delegate spots out of 12 total at-large delegates, Mitt Romney outperformed his 35% straw poll share of the vote by almost 100%.2 In other words, had Colorado proportionally allocated its at-large delegates, Romney would have received just four delegates. On this particular weekend, this statewide (state convention) vote was the closest thing to North Dakota that was witnessed across two other (mostly) non-binding caucus states.
Congressional Districts:
Of all the candidates, Mitt Romney had the most delegates at five of the seven Colorado congressional district conventions. Of course, that overlooks the fact that there was a fairly significant cache of unpledged delegates across all seven districts. It also turns a blind eye to the reality that Santorum's and Paul's collective delegate strength was greater than Romney's in five of the seven districts. In those two districts where Romney outmatched the Paul/Santorum "team"3 -- the 3rd and 6th districts -- Romney won one and two delegates respectively. Unpledged delegates won the other two delegate positions in the 3rd and the other one in the 6th. It may, then, have been less about a collective effort between Paul and Santorum supporters than the majority of unpledged delegates in both of those districts.
What was truly strange was that Santorum won any of the congressional district delegates. He placed fourth in the number of congressional district convention delegates in the 1st (one delegate won) and 2nd (one delegate won), and third in the 4th (one delegate won), 5th (two delegates won), and 7th (one delegate won). No candidate received all three delegates from any of the seven congressional districts, but Santorum winning two delegates in a district where he finished behind "Unpledged" and Paul -- in that order -- was noteworthy the weekend after the former Pennsylvania senator suspended his campaign.
Meanwhile, it was perhaps even stranger that Ron Paul emerged from the Colorado district conventions with no pledged delegates. Many Paul supporters celebrated the overall unpledged victory, claiming that those are Ron Paul delegates. And with Santorum out, that may not necessarily be untrue, though Santorum delegates comprise six of the 20 total slots that were not either Romney delegates or automatic delegates in the Colorado delegation.
| 2012 Colorado Republican Party Congressional District Delegate Breakdown (National Convention Delegates Won in Parentheses) | |||||
| District | Unpledged | Romney | Santorum | Paul | Gingrich |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| #1 | 20 (2) | 31 | 7 (1) | 36 | 5 |
| #2 | 51 (2) | 14 | 7 (1) | 13 | 1 |
| #3 | 89 (2) | 27 (1) | 19 | 6 | 2 |
| #4 | 78 (2) | 28 | 23 (1) | 13 | 0 |
| #5 | 35 | 9 (1) | 14 (2) | 17 | 0 |
| #6 | 48 (1) | 31 (2) | 11 | 4 | 0 |
| #7 | 56 (1) | 21 (1) | 16 (1) | 10 | 0 |
| (Total) | (10) | (5) | (6) | (0) | (0) |
What, then, can we take away from the weekend?
For starters, this provides us with perhaps the polar opposite to what happened in North Dakota, where the state party put forth a delegate slate for vote before the entire state convention that was weighted toward Mitt Romney. Romney may or may not do well among the Minnesota at-large delegate slate, the Paul, Santorum and Gingrich supporters aren't rolling over and playing dead.
...even if Romney is the presumptive Republican nominee.
And again, this further fills out the picture of the connection between the straw poll results and the actual delegate allocation in the non-binding/unbound delegate caucus states. It may be that at some point everyone rallies behind Mitt Romney as the Republican nominee, but that is not happening yet as the state conventions for these caucus states roll around. North Dakota was evidence that the party (state or national) was willing that to be the case, but Colorado and Minnesota have given the counterargument: That the straw poll, or more to the point, the precinct caucuses are not entirely meaningless. There is no binding mechanism, but that does not mean that the delegates chosen to move from one round of the caucus/convention process are not devoid of presidential candidate preferences. The fallout from North Dakota and the results in Colorado and (so far in) Minnesota should speak to that. None of these allocations have been proportional to the straw poll results, nor have they been winner-take-all. They are the organic byproduct of the caucus/convention system; unbound by direct allocation rules.
The expectation is that Romney will likely move toward a consolidation of the vote in the remaining primary states, but these caucus states -- finishing up a process that was borne out of an earlier and competitive portion of this race -- will be worth watching. Delegates committed to the non-Romney candidates may continue to be for their candidates.
...or at least against the presumptive nominee as these processes run their course. Want a signal that the not-Romney voters and delegates have given up? Watch these delegate allocating state conventions as primaries continue to tip toward Romney.
--
1 Delegates supporting Rick Santorum took the other two slots.
2 Colorado Republican Party National Delegate Results:
Colorado Republican Party National Delegate Results
3 This was something that FHQ brought up last week in setting the stage for the Colorado delegate allocation.
Recent Posts:
Hey Hey, Ho Ho. This Romney Protest's Got to Go?
Santorum Suspends: A Nomination Race in Context
Cart Before the Horse: Pennsylvania/Colorado Edition
Are you following FHQ on Twitter, Google+ and Facebook? Click on the links to join in.
Thursday, April 30, 2015
Colorado Bill to Reestablish Presidential Primary Introduced
On Wednesday, April 29, SB 15-287 was introduced in the Colorado state Senate. The bill would reestablish a presidential primary in the Centennial state for the first time since 2000. The details largely match the description that was leaked last week.
As FHQ said at the time, the interesting news in this is the process being created rather than the switch from a caucuses/convention system to a primary election. Under the provisions of the bill, the Colorado governor would have the power to set the date of the primary in a fairly tight window of time. Before September 1 of the year prior to a presidential election, the governor is called on to set a date for the presidential primary election the following year between:
That a single individual would have the date-setting authority if this bill is passed and signed into law would make Colorado like Arizona was during the 2004-2012 period (when the governor could issue a proclamation to move the primary earlier), but also like New Hampshire and Georgia where the secretary of state holds the power to set the date. Colorado would have less flexibility than Georgia and much less than the carte blanche flexibility New Hampshire's secretary of state has to keep the Granite state presidential primary first.
One additional facet of this bill that should be mentioned is that the aforementioned ambiguity of the front end of the scheduling window does potentially create some uncertainty. Call this the Florida 2013 problem. Recall, that the original law change that brought the Florida presidential primary back into compliance with the national party rules had a similar "earliest point on the calendar in which a delegation won't be penalized" provision. If we were to count only the penalty that both parties levy for going too early, that earliest date a Colorado primary could be would be March 1. Yet, if Colorado Republicans opted for a winner-take-all method of allocation, it would shrink the window down to just March 15.
Fortunately, the last time Colorado Republicans had a primary -- and not non-binding caucuses -- the party allocated their national convention delegates on a proportional basis.
The final take home on this one is that it would transition Colorado from a closed caucuses system to a primary system opened to unaffiliated voters as well. As John Frank reported last week, this is a bipartisan move overall. There are 28 co-sponsors of the legislation across both chambers of the legislature. Two House Democrats join 17 majority Republicans and in the upper chamber where Democrats are in control, six Republicans combine with three Democratic sponsors. That is tilted toward the Republicans, but bipartisan nonetheless. Both parties appear ready to attempt to engage and battle over those unaffiliated voters in higher turnout election that would take place some time during the first half of March.
As FHQ said at the time, the interesting news in this is the process being created rather than the switch from a caucuses/convention system to a primary election. Under the provisions of the bill, the Colorado governor would have the power to set the date of the primary in a fairly tight window of time. Before September 1 of the year prior to a presidential election, the governor is called on to set a date for the presidential primary election the following year between:
- a time NO EARLIER THAN THE DATE THE NATIONAL RULES OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES PROVIDE FOR STATE DELEGATIONS TO THE PARTY'S NATIONAL CONVENTION TO BE ALLOCATED WITHOUT PENALTY ...and...
- a point on the calendar NOT LATER THAN THE THIRD TUESDAY IN MARCH.
That a single individual would have the date-setting authority if this bill is passed and signed into law would make Colorado like Arizona was during the 2004-2012 period (when the governor could issue a proclamation to move the primary earlier), but also like New Hampshire and Georgia where the secretary of state holds the power to set the date. Colorado would have less flexibility than Georgia and much less than the carte blanche flexibility New Hampshire's secretary of state has to keep the Granite state presidential primary first.
One additional facet of this bill that should be mentioned is that the aforementioned ambiguity of the front end of the scheduling window does potentially create some uncertainty. Call this the Florida 2013 problem. Recall, that the original law change that brought the Florida presidential primary back into compliance with the national party rules had a similar "earliest point on the calendar in which a delegation won't be penalized" provision. If we were to count only the penalty that both parties levy for going too early, that earliest date a Colorado primary could be would be March 1. Yet, if Colorado Republicans opted for a winner-take-all method of allocation, it would shrink the window down to just March 15.
Fortunately, the last time Colorado Republicans had a primary -- and not non-binding caucuses -- the party allocated their national convention delegates on a proportional basis.
The final take home on this one is that it would transition Colorado from a closed caucuses system to a primary system opened to unaffiliated voters as well. As John Frank reported last week, this is a bipartisan move overall. There are 28 co-sponsors of the legislation across both chambers of the legislature. Two House Democrats join 17 majority Republicans and in the upper chamber where Democrats are in control, six Republicans combine with three Democratic sponsors. That is tilted toward the Republicans, but bipartisan nonetheless. Both parties appear ready to attempt to engage and battle over those unaffiliated voters in higher turnout election that would take place some time during the first half of March.
Wednesday, July 27, 2011
Colorado GOP "Much More Inclined" to Leave Caucuses in March, but Keep February "Door Open"
Colorado Republican Party chairman, Ryan Call, brought attention to the Centennial state's 2012 delegate selection last week by suggesting that the party is considering using a provision of state election law to shift next year's presidential precinct caucuses up to the first Tuesday in February. While that option is on the table and legal, though in violation of Republican National Committee rules, Call, in a follow up with Lynn Bartels of the Denver Post, indicated that the new first Tuesday in March Colorado caucus date is still more likely.
"We are much more inclined to keep it in March out of deference to the tremendous amount of work that the county clerks would have to do to be ready for a February caucus," Call said. "But I also think we'd be doing the voters of Colorado a disservice if we didn't at least keep the door open."
Call said he wants to guard against a scenario in which the nominee for president is a done deal by the time Colorado's caucus rolls around.
Keeping the option open is one thing, but Colorado Republicans are running out of time if they are going to make a decision before October 1. [A decision from the Colorado State Central Committee meeting in September (date TBD).] What's more, the optics of the Republican nomination race -- in other words whether the nomination will be competitive up to a March 6 Colorado caucus -- are not likely to be any clearer then than they are now. That is, unless Romney, say, wins the Ames Straw poll and somehow appears inevitable or if Rick Perry jumps in -- or another candidate already in the race -- and quickly establishes himself (or herself) as a dominant frontrunner. That picture just does not seem to be heading toward a clear resolution in Colorado Republicans' timeframe.
Now, whether that means that March 6 is as close to a done deal for the state party is an open question. This is politics, after all, and much can change.
UPDATE: In a Denver Post op/ed piece, Chairman Call is also reported to have said:
Ryan Call, the Colorado GOP chairman, told us there is only an "outside chance" state Republicans would move their caucus from March 6 to Feb. 7, and would only do so if Iowa and some other states were to schedule primaries "at Christmas time."
Again, if the timeframe for a decision on the caucus from Colorado Republicans is the next State Central Committee meeting, then it very likely won't be totally clear if Iowa and other states are in December. At this point, there seems to be enough room even with a January 31 Arizona primary to fit the early four states and Florida into January. It may be compressed, but all those states can fit, though it may not be the most advantageous position for those states.
Recent Posts:
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
A Projected 2012 Electoral College Map (version 1.0)
For a look at the 2012-2020 electoral college map based on the 2010 Census click here. And for look at how those changes would have affected the 2008 presidential election click here.
There is no shortage of projections on how the 435 House seats will be reapportioned following the 2010 Census and like anything else, they range from modest changes to volatile, far-reaching changes. [And you can also see Nate Silver's attempts to update the 2007 projections -- the basis of both the linked projections above -- here.] What's funny is that both the links cite the same source, Election Data Services, yet describe very different projections. Well, the CQ article cites EDS while The Washington Times uses a combination of the EDS projections and those from Polidata. The Polidata end seems to be adding all the volatility. As such, I'm going to lean on the more conservative EDS projection (Silver's is in between but closer to EDS.).
[Alright, get to the point. How's the map going to look in four years?]
Well, here you go, complete with map and seat gains/losses:
[Click Map to Enlarge]
I jokingly ended the electoral college map slideshow with a blank map that had the election date of the 2012 election on it. But that one wasn't accurate; it didn't reflect the changes due to reapportionment that will happen between now and 2012. So what do we know about the changes? As all the articles that discuss the upcoming apportionment typically say, the South and southwest gain while the Rust Belt and into the northeast states continue to lose seats. But a blank map isn't really telling you a whole lot, is it? How about a real world application?
What would the McCain-Obama contest have looked like if this projected 2012 map was used instead? [Well, I made that one too.]
[Click Map to Enlarge]
McCain would gain three electoral votes on Obama and that is it. For the record, the Polidata projection, wacky as it is, would only yield McCain a few additional electoral votes. In a year that tilts toward the Democrats, those changes are manageable, but in a year with conditions triggering a more competitive contest, those changes might help the GOP. Then again, if the changes in Colorado and Nevada are lasting, Indiana, North Carolina and Virginia remain competitive, and Arizona and Georgia continue to trend toward the Democratic Party, they may benefit the Democrats.
UPDATE: One other way we can look at the changes more in-depth is to examine how that six electoral vote shift toward McCain in the projected 2012 apportionment changes the outlook on the Electoral College Spectrum. So, we can see how/if the campaigns' target states would have shifted if the map was different.
In September 2008, there was a time when Colorado or New Hampshire would have put Obama or McCain over the top in the electoral college. If Obama had won all the states favoring him up to and including Colorado the president-elect would have netted 269 electoral votes. The same was true of John McCain in terms of New Hampshire. Obama would have needed New Hampshire and McCain would have needed Colorado to cross the 270 electoral vote threshold. But Colorado eventually swapped positions with New Hampshire and moved into sole possession of the "victory line" distinction. To win Colorado, then, meant that the winner was the victor in the presidential race (...if they won the other states ranked behind the Centennial state).
Would that have been the case, though, if the 2012 map were in place for this past election?
Well, no. That reapportionment-triggered shift toward McCain would have brought Virginia into the mix on the cycle's final Electoral College Spectrum. As was the case in the Colorado/New Hampshire situation, no one state would have been the Victory Line state. Instead, the possibility of an electoral college tie would have been put on the table. Both Virginia and Colorado would have to be won fo either of the candidates to pass the 270 electoral vote barrier. Of course, Obama won and held a six state cushion beyond that, but if the race had been, say, five or six points closer, Virginia would have been in play and the likelihood of an electoral college tie would have increased substantially.
Recent Posts:
The R Word: Was 2008 a Realigning Election?
2008 Electoral College Wrap Up
How Stuff Works: An Alaska Vacancy in the US Senate
There is no shortage of projections on how the 435 House seats will be reapportioned following the 2010 Census and like anything else, they range from modest changes to volatile, far-reaching changes. [And you can also see Nate Silver's attempts to update the 2007 projections -- the basis of both the linked projections above -- here.] What's funny is that both the links cite the same source, Election Data Services, yet describe very different projections. Well, the CQ article cites EDS while The Washington Times uses a combination of the EDS projections and those from Polidata. The Polidata end seems to be adding all the volatility. As such, I'm going to lean on the more conservative EDS projection (Silver's is in between but closer to EDS.).
[Alright, get to the point. How's the map going to look in four years?]
Well, here you go, complete with map and seat gains/losses:
[Click Map to Enlarge]I jokingly ended the electoral college map slideshow with a blank map that had the election date of the 2012 election on it. But that one wasn't accurate; it didn't reflect the changes due to reapportionment that will happen between now and 2012. So what do we know about the changes? As all the articles that discuss the upcoming apportionment typically say, the South and southwest gain while the Rust Belt and into the northeast states continue to lose seats. But a blank map isn't really telling you a whole lot, is it? How about a real world application?
What would the McCain-Obama contest have looked like if this projected 2012 map was used instead? [Well, I made that one too.]
[Click Map to Enlarge]McCain would gain three electoral votes on Obama and that is it. For the record, the Polidata projection, wacky as it is, would only yield McCain a few additional electoral votes. In a year that tilts toward the Democrats, those changes are manageable, but in a year with conditions triggering a more competitive contest, those changes might help the GOP. Then again, if the changes in Colorado and Nevada are lasting, Indiana, North Carolina and Virginia remain competitive, and Arizona and Georgia continue to trend toward the Democratic Party, they may benefit the Democrats.
UPDATE: One other way we can look at the changes more in-depth is to examine how that six electoral vote shift toward McCain in the projected 2012 apportionment changes the outlook on the Electoral College Spectrum. So, we can see how/if the campaigns' target states would have shifted if the map was different.
In September 2008, there was a time when Colorado or New Hampshire would have put Obama or McCain over the top in the electoral college. If Obama had won all the states favoring him up to and including Colorado the president-elect would have netted 269 electoral votes. The same was true of John McCain in terms of New Hampshire. Obama would have needed New Hampshire and McCain would have needed Colorado to cross the 270 electoral vote threshold. But Colorado eventually swapped positions with New Hampshire and moved into sole possession of the "victory line" distinction. To win Colorado, then, meant that the winner was the victor in the presidential race (...if they won the other states ranked behind the Centennial state).
Would that have been the case, though, if the 2012 map were in place for this past election?
| The Electoral College Spectrum* | ||||
| HI-4 (7)** | ME-4 (155) | NM-5 (260) | ND-3 (377/164) | AK-3 (62) |
| VT-3 (10) | OR-7 (162) | CO-9*** (269/278) | GA-16 (161) | KY-8 (59) |
| DE-3 (13) | WA-11 (173) | VA-13*** (282/269) | WV-5 (145) | TN-11 (51) |
| NY-30 (43) | NJ-15 (188) | NV-6 (288/256) | AZ-11 (140) | KS-6 (40) |
| IL-21 (64) | IA-6 (194) | OH-19 (307/250) | SD-3 (129) | NE-5 (34) |
| MD-10 (74) | WI-10 (204) | FL-28 (335/231) | LA-8 (126) | AL-9 (29) |
| RI-4 (78) | MN-10 (214) | NC-15 (350/203) | AR-6 (118) | WY-3 (120) |
| MA-11 (89) | PA-20 (234) | MO-10 (360/188) | TX-36 (112) | ID-4 (17) |
| CA-55 (144) | MI-17 (251) | IN-11 (371/178) | MS-6 (76) | UT-6 (13) |
| CT-7 (151) | NH-4 (255) | MT-3 (374/167) | SC-8 (70) | OK-7 (7) |
| *Follow the link for a detailed explanation on how to read the Electoral College Spectrum. **The numbers in the parentheses refer to the number of electoral votes a candidate would have if he won all the states ranked prior to that state. If, for example, McCain won all the states up to and including Colorado (all Obama's toss up states plus Colorado), he would have 274 electoral votes. Both candidates numbers are only totaled through their rival's toss up states. In those cases, Obama's number is on the left and McCain's is on the right in italics. ***The point between Colorado and Virginia is where Obama crosses (or McCain would cross) the 270 electoral vote threshold to win the presidential election. Obama would need Virginia and McCain would have needed Colorado to have surpassed that barrier. That line is referred to as the victory line. Under the actual 2008 electoral college distribution, Colorado was the state that each candidate needed to cross 270. | ||||
Well, no. That reapportionment-triggered shift toward McCain would have brought Virginia into the mix on the cycle's final Electoral College Spectrum. As was the case in the Colorado/New Hampshire situation, no one state would have been the Victory Line state. Instead, the possibility of an electoral college tie would have been put on the table. Both Virginia and Colorado would have to be won fo either of the candidates to pass the 270 electoral vote barrier. Of course, Obama won and held a six state cushion beyond that, but if the race had been, say, five or six points closer, Virginia would have been in play and the likelihood of an electoral college tie would have increased substantially.
Recent Posts:
The R Word: Was 2008 a Realigning Election?
2008 Electoral College Wrap Up
How Stuff Works: An Alaska Vacancy in the US Senate
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)